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作者：Gao, Pingyang; Zhang, Gaoqing
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We study firms' investment in internal controls to reduce accounting manipulation. We first show that peer managers' manipulation decisions are strategic complements: one manager manipulates more if he believes that reports of peer firms are more likely to be manipulated. As a result, one firm's investment in internal controls has a positive externality on peer firms. It reduces its own manager's manipulation, which, in turn, mitigates the manipulation pressure on managers at peer firms. Firms...
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作者：Liang, Pierre Jinghong; Zhang, Gaoqing
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：In this paper, we analyze the social value of accounting objectivity in maintaining financial stability. Building on an early influential accounting study by Ijiri and Jaedicke (1966), we operationalize two informational properties, accuracy (free of collective bias) and objectivity (degree of consensus), in a correlated information structure and embed them into a model of runs on financial institutions. We show that when compared with the accuracy property, the objectivity property exhibits a...
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作者：Lyle, Matthew R.
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This study finds that the association between future stock returns and information quality depends on how option-like is the firm's equity. Firms that have more growth options are more option-like. The association between future stock returns and information quality is negative (positive) for those firms with equity that is least (most) option-like. These results are consistent with traditional asset pricing theory and are robust to numerous empirical specifications. Collectively, these findin...
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作者：Badertscher, Brad A.; Shanthikumar, Devin M.; Teoh, Siew Hong
作者单位：University of Notre Dame; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：We study how public firm misvaluation affects private peer firm investments. An economic competition hypothesis predicts a negative relation because misvaluation-induced new investment by public firms crowds out investment by private peers that share common input or output markets. An alternative shared sentiment hypothesis predicts a positive relation because private firm stakeholders share in the sentiment associated with misvaluation in public markets. Misvaluation is proxied using both the...
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作者：Cunningham, Lauren M.; Li, Chan; Stein, Sarah E.; Wright, Nicole S.
作者单位：University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; University of Kansas; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; James Madison University
摘要：We investigate changes in the quality and cost of audit services surrounding PCAOB Rule 3211, which requires disclosure of audit partner names in Form AP. To isolate changes due to Rule 3211 from other confounding factors, we use difference-in-differences analyses with separate control groups, including a group of companies that disclosed partner identities prior to Rule 3211. Our study also incorporates several measures from prior literature to proxy for various dimensions of audit quality. E...
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作者：Bhaskar, Lori Shefchik; Schroeder, Joseph H.; Shepardson, Marcy L.
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：The quality of financial statement (FS) audits integrated with audits of internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) depends upon the quality of ICFR information used in, and its integration into, FS audits. Recent research and PCAOB inspections find auditors underreport existing ICFR weaknesses and perform insufficient testing to address identified risks, suggesting integrated audits-in which substantial ICFR testing is required-may result in lower FS audit quality than FS-only audits. ...
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作者：Sethuraman, Mani
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：This paper explores the effect of a credit rating agency's (CRA) reputation on the voluntary disclosures of corporate bond issuers. Academics, practitioners, and regulators disagree on the informational role played by major CRAs and the usefulness of credit ratings in influencing investors' perception of the credit risk of bond issuers. Using management earnings forecasts as a measure of voluntary disclosure, I find that investors demand more (less) disclosure from corporate bond issuers when ...
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作者：Amiram, Dan; Bauer, Andrew M.; Frank, Mary Margaret
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of Waterloo; University of Virginia
摘要：We exploit changes in a country's integration of corporate and shareholder taxes to identify the effect of investor-level taxes on costly corporate tax avoidance. Specifically, we rely on European countries eliminating imputation systems in different years in response to supranational judicial rulings. These eliminations, which are exogenous to the firm, remove managers' disincentive to engage in tax avoidance if they consider investor-level taxes. Using a difference-in-differences model with ...
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作者：Goncharov, Igor; Peter, Caspar David
作者单位：Lancaster University; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC
摘要：Firms coordinate their actions with industry peers, thereby affecting product market competition. Using the cartel setting, we investigate how financial reporting transparency affects industry coordination. Economic theory predicts that transparency might either prolong cartel duration through increased contracting efficiency, or destabilize cartels due to earlier detection of deviating members. We test these predictions on firms indicted by the European Commission for anticompetitive behavior...
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作者：Nichol, Jennifer E.
作者单位：Northeastern University
摘要：This study examines the effects of incentive contract framing on misreporting and entitlement. I conduct a 2 3 2 between-subjects experiment, manipulating incentive contract framing (Bonus/Penalty) and the awareness of the opportunity to misreport (Before Effort/After Effort). I predict and find that (1) penalty contracts cause a higher rate and degree of misreporting, and (2) this greater misreporting occurs due to a greater sense of entitlement to the incentive funds. Collectively, this stud...
