The Effects of Contract Framing on Misconduct and Entitlement

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nichol, Jennifer E.
• 署名单位: Northeastern University
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/accr-52260
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 329-344
• 关键词: psychological entitlement; honesty; management; theft

摘要

This study examines the effects of incentive contract framing on misreporting and entitlement. I conduct a 2 3 2 between-subjects experiment, manipulating incentive contract framing (Bonus/Penalty) and the awareness of the opportunity to misreport (Before Effort/After Effort). I predict and find that (1) penalty contracts cause a higher rate and degree of misreporting, and (2) this greater misreporting occurs due to a greater sense of entitlement to the incentive funds. Collectively, this study's theory and results indicate that while penalty contracts can sometimes increase effort relative to bonus contracts, they also encourage greater dishonesty in reporting when that effort is not successful.