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作者：Lourie, Ben
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：Equity analysts are often hired by firms they cover. I document the extent to which this revolving door phenomenon impairs analysts' independence. I do this by examining the presence of biased research reports issued during the year before analysts are employed by a firm they cover. I find that during their final year, revolving door analysts bias their EPS forecasts, their target prices, and their recommendations in a direction that suggests that they are attempting to gain favor from their p...
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作者：Chen, Qi; Jiang, Xu; Zhang, Yun
作者单位：Duke University; George Washington University
摘要：We develop a model to evaluate the costs and benefits of disclosing information about audit quality. Specifically, we examine whether audit quality disclosure affects auditors' effort and investors' investment efficiency. In our setting, an auditor exerts unobservable effort to influence audit quality and is motivated by liability in the event of audit failure. The usefulness of audited financial reports for investors depends on both the quality of the underlying financial reporting (e.g., as ...
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作者：Church, Bryan K.; Jiang, Wei; Kuang, Xi (Jason); Vitalis, Adam
作者单位：Renmin University of China; Jinan University; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; University of Waterloo
摘要：We experimentally investigate how managers' decisions to invest discretionary resources in the company's corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives are affected by whether the investment decision is denominated in financial or nonfinancial measures (i.e., the measurement basis used for decision making). We posit that nonfinancial measures bring attention to the society-serving nature of CSR investments, thus activating the pro-CSR social norms of the company and managers' personal CSR n...
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作者：Hurley, Patrick J.; Mayhew, Brian W.; Obermire, Kara M.
作者单位：Northeastern University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Oregon State University
摘要：We use experimental economic markets to examine the impact of changing institutional design features on audit quality. Specifically, we manipulate auditors' economic accountability to managers by altering who hires the auditor-a manager or an independent third party-and auditors' psychological accountability to investors by explicitly stating that the auditor is hired on the investors' behalf. Our design shifts auditors' accountability from managers, who have directional goal preferences, to i...
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作者：Black, Johnathan; Chen, Jeff Zeyun; Cussatt, Marc
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作者：Utke, Steven
作者单位：University of Connecticut
摘要：I examine the role of heterogeneous shareholder-level taxes in organizational form decisions and in subsequent changes in investor stock ownership. Specifically, I investigate the decision to form a master limited partnership (MLP), which is a tax-advantaged entity for tax-sensitive shareholders, but a tax-disadvantaged entity for tax-exempt shareholders. Consistent with shareholder-level taxes influencing organizational form decisions, I find that firms owned by more tax-exempt shareholders a...
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作者：Darrough, Masako N.; Deng, Mingcherng
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
摘要：We analyze the role of accounting information in debt contracting when the lender has private information that can assist in the borrower's investment decision. The lender might have acquired private information during the due diligence process or via past lending relationships. We show that the borrower has a stronger incentive to engage in a suboptimal investment decision (i.e., asset substitution) ex post when the lender lacks incentive to truthfully reveal this information. We identify con...
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作者：Beyer, Anne; Guttman, Ilan; Marinovic, Ivan
作者单位：Stanford University; New York University
摘要：We study a model of earnings management and provide predictions about the time-series properties of earnings quality and reporting bias. We estimate the model to empirically separate two components of investor uncertainty: fundamental economic uncertainty, and information asymmetry between the manager and investors due to reporting noise. We find that (1) the null hypothesis of zero reporting bias is rejected; (2) the ratio of the variance of the noise introduced by the reporting process to th...
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作者：Carter, Mary Ellen; Franco, Francesca; Tuna, Irem
作者单位：Boston College; University of London; London Business School
摘要：We study whether executives receive pay premiums for the uncertainty of their match with a new firm. Using changes in executive-firm matches from Execucomp, we document that executives receive significant attraction premiums when they move to new firms. These premiums vary with proxies that capture potential sources of uncertainty about the quality of the match, and are incremental to pay for managerial talent, generalist ability, industry turnover risk, and potential additional costs incurred...
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作者：Khan, Urooj; Li, Xinlei; Williams, Christopher D.; Wittenberg-Moerman, Regina
作者单位：Columbia University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Southern California
摘要：We examine how personal lending relationships between lenders and managers are affected by information and accounting environments of borrowing firms. We address this question by exploring whether, following managerial turnover, lenders migrate with the manager from the firm where a relationship developed (origin firm) to the manager's new firm (destination firm). We find that the opacity of the external information environment of the destination firm significantly increases the probability of...
