-
作者：Gao, Pingyang; Zhang, Gaoqing
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We propose a model to study how auditing standards affect audit quality. We posit that both auditors' incentives and expertise are relevant for audit effectiveness. Auditing standards are useful in mitigating the auditors' possible misalignment of interest with investors. However, auditing standards also restrict auditors' exercise of professional judgment, which, in turn, leads to compliance mentality and reduces auditors' incentives to become competent in the first place. We identify the con...
-
作者：Li, Meng
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：This paper studies, both theoretically and empirically, how subordinates to CEOs can discipline the CEOs' self-serving activities. I predict that because CEOs' self-serving activities hurt the subordinates through the subordinates' stakes in the firms, the subordinates who observe these activities will take actions that negatively affect the CEOs, and that in anticipation of such reactions by subordinates, the CEOs will limit their own misbehaviors. This disciplinary mechanism will become more...
-
作者：Bentley, Jeremiah W.
作者单位：University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst
摘要：Prior research finds that agents who are compensated on an imperfect measure of performance tend to distort their operational decisions and believe that the measure is more reflective of reality than it actually is (i. e., they surrogate). I find that agents distort decisions less and surrogate less when they can provide unverifiable narrative explanations for their actions. In my experiment, experienced chess players place bets on and write explanations about in-progress chess games. I manipu...
