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作者：Guan, Yuyan; Lobo, Gerald J.; Tsang, Albert; Xin, Xiangang
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong; University of Houston System; University of Houston; Hong Kong Polytechnic University
摘要：We investigate the relationship between societal trust and managers' decisions to voluntarily issue earnings forecasts. We reason that managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts in high-trust countries than in low-trust countries because investors view these voluntary disclosures as more credible information about the firm's future profitability. We find evidence consistent with these predictions, suggesting that societal trust fosters corporate voluntary disclosure. We also document...
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作者：Li, Zengquan; Wong, T. J.; Yu, Gwen
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University of Southern California; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：When emerging market firms disclose relationship-based transactions, they face a trade-off in which greater transparency may help lower their cost of capital at the cost of revealing proprietary information. We find that firms overcome this challenge by relying on analysts within their private networks (i.e., connected analysts) who, through repeated interaction with the firm, can better verify relationship-based transactions. Using Chinese firms, we show that firms with more connected analyst...
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作者：Cazier, Richard A.; Merkley, Kenneth J.; Treu, John S.
作者单位：University of North Texas System; University of North Texas Denton; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; West Virginia University
摘要：Prior research finds that positive tone in firms' qualitative disclosures increases the risk of shareholder lawsuits. However, federal securities laws provide a safe harbor intended to shield firms' forward-looking statements from legal liability. One implication of this safe harbor is that litigation risk potentially varies between qualitative forward- and non-forward-looking statements. Consistent with this implication, we find that positive tone in forward-looking qualitative statements is ...
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作者：Friedman, Henry L.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：This study examines whether investor-level preferences for director characteristics influence portfolio choices, using data on the U.S. holdings of non-U.S. funds. Consistent with bias-based preferences influencing portfolio allocations, funds from countries with greater gender inequality invest less and hold smaller stakes in firms with more female directors. Since variation in funds' home country gender biases are plausibly unrelated to the selection and performance of female directors in U....
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作者：Guenther, David A.; Njoroge, Kenneth; Williams, Brian M.
作者单位：University of Oregon; William & Mary; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：We provide evidence about allocations of cash flow freed up by not paying taxes (tax-related cash''). Uncertainty about future repayments suggests firms may use tax-related cash more cautiously than other cash flow. We utilize a flow-of-funds model from finance to quantify the relative amounts of tax-related cash associated with various potential uses of operating cash flow. We find firms allocate tax-related cash differently than other after-tax cash flow. Prior studies find tax avoiders hold...
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作者：Ogneva, Maria; Piotroski, Joseph D.; Zakolyukina, Anastasia A.
作者单位：University of Southern California; Stanford University; University of Chicago
摘要：In this paper, we use accounting fundamentals to measure systematic risk of distress. Our main testable prediction-that this risk increases with the probability of recessionary failure, P(RjF)-is based on a stylized model that guides our empirical analyses. We first apply the lasso method to select accounting fundamentals that can be combined into P(RjF) estimates. We then use the obtained estimates in asset-pricing tests. This approach successfully extracts systematic risk information from ac...
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作者：Bertomeu, Jeremy; Ma, Paul; Marinovic, Ivan
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Stanford University
摘要：We estimate a dynamic model of voluntary disclosure, using annual management forecasts of earnings, that features a manager with price motives and an uncertain, but persistent, information endowment. Our estimates imply that: (1) managers face disclosure frictions 35 percent of the time; (2) conditional on being informed, managers withhold information 17 percent of the time; and (3) conditional on being silent, managers possess information 24 percent of the time. Managers' strategic withholdin...
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作者：Wells, Kara
作者单位：Southern Methodist University
摘要：I investigate whether individual managers have an incremental effect on firms' accounting quality (AQ) after controlling for known determinants of AQ, time fixed effects, and firm fixed effects. To identify the manager-specific effect on firm AQ, I construct a dataset that tracks the movement of 907 managers across firms over the period 1992-2014. Results indicate that individual manager fixed effects explain a statistically and economically significant proportion of the cross-sectional variat...
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作者：Aobdia, Daniel; Li, Qin; Na, Ke; Wu, Hong
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Fudan University
摘要：This paper examines the influence of labor market power in the audit profession. Using a dataset of online job postings, we confirm that audit offices in more concentrated labor markets have greater labor market power and exercise it in the form of higher skill requirements and greater required effort from their auditors, at similar or slightly lower wages. We then show that client firms of audit offices in more concentrated labor markets are less likely to restate their earnings and have lowe...
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作者：Grabner, Isabella; Kunneke, Judith; Moers, Frank
作者单位：Vienna University of Economics & Business; Tilburg University; Maastricht University
摘要：While prior research on performance evaluation bias has mainly focused on the determinants and consequences of rating errors, we investigate how a firm can provide implicit incentives to supervisors to mitigate these errors via its calibration committee. We empirically examine the extent to which a calibration committee incorporates supervisors' evaluation behavior with respect to their subordinates in the performance evaluation outcomes, i.e., performance ratings and promotion decisions, for ...
