How Often Do Managers Withhold Information?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bertomeu, Jeremy; Ma, Paul; Marinovic, Ivan
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/accr-52619
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 73-102
• 关键词: voluntary disclosures; earnings quality; bad news; ANALYST; nondisclosure; DYNAMICS; MARKET; speak; cost

摘要

We estimate a dynamic model of voluntary disclosure, using annual management forecasts of earnings, that features a manager with price motives and an uncertain, but persistent, information endowment. Our estimates imply that: (1) managers face disclosure frictions 35 percent of the time; (2) conditional on being informed, managers withhold information 17 percent of the time; and (3) conditional on being silent, managers possess information 24 percent of the time. Managers' strategic withholding motives increase investors' uncertainty about earnings by 3 percent. We find that managers' price motives reduce strategic withholding by one-third in response to investors' increased skepticism in the event of non-disclosure.