-
作者：Gonzalez, George C.; Hoffman, Vicky B.; Moser, Donald V.
作者单位：University of Lethbridge; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：Conventional economics assumes workers provide the same effort under penalty contracts and economically equivalent bonus contracts. However, prior research finds that although workers prefer bonus contracts, they provide more effort under penalty contracts. Given these findings, the prevalence of bonus contracts in practice is puzzling. If penalty contracts yield more worker effort, why would employers not use them more often? We conduct experimental labor markets to test whether the prior fin...
-
作者：Heese, Jonas; Perez-Cavazos, Gerardo
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We study the effects of visits by headquarters' managers on facility-level misconduct. These visits are central to monitoring, but are difficult to observe for a large sample of firms. We use the staggered introduction of airline routes to identify exogenous reductions in travel time between headquarters and facilities as our measure of visits and test whether the reductions affect misconduct. We find that for the at-risk sample, travel-time reductions decrease the number of violations by 2 pe...
-
作者：Bhattacharjee, Sudip; Hillison, Sean M.; Malone, Carissa L.
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：As remote auditing remains widespread, the profession is concerned that decreased auditor-client interactions and remote supervision challenges can reduce audit quality. In response, some firms have increased supervisor monitoring of remote auditors. We experimentally examine how two key remote audit factors, the spatial distance between auditors and clients and the frequency of supervisor monitoring, influence auditors' judgments in creative tasks. We predict and find that working remotely fa...
-
作者：Hope, Ole-Kristian; Lu, Haihao (Ross)
作者单位：University of Toronto; BI Norwegian Business School; University of Waterloo
摘要：This paper examines economic consequences of a 2006 Securities and Exchange Commission regulation that mandated public firms to disclose their governance policies on related-party transactions (RPTs). Employing hand-collected RPT data for S&P 1500 firms, we find that the initiation of RPT governance disclosure significantly reduces the occurrence of RPTs, and that the reduction in RPTs is negatively associated with the implied cost of capital (ICC) and positively related to Tobin's Q. These ef...
-
作者：Jenkinson, Tim; Landsman, Wayne R.; Rountree, Brian R.; Soonawalla, Kazbi
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Rice University
摘要：This study analyzes whether fair value estimates of fund net asset values (NAVs) produced by private equity managers are accurate and unbiased predictors of future discounted cash flows (DCFs). We exploit the fact that private equity funds have finite lives to compare reported NAVs to DCFs based on realized cash flows for 384 Venture Capital (VC) funds and 195 Buyout funds spanning 1988-2016. Findings reveal that Buyout funds' NAVs display little systematic bias, but VC funds' NAVs are relativ...
-
作者：Klein, April; Li, Tao; Zhang, Bobo
作者单位：New York University; University of Warwick; State University System of Florida; University of Florida; NEOMA Business School
摘要：A number of sell-side healthcare analysts gain access to information outside the purview of management through Freedom of Information Act requests to the Food and Drug Administration for records on factory inspections, complaints, and drug and medical device applications. Using a difference-in-differences methodology, we find that buy (sell) recommendations and upgrades (downgrades) earn higher (lower) stock returns over the year following the receipt of FDA records. We also examine the type o...
-
作者：Dambra, Michael J.; Gustafson, Matthew; Quinn, Phillip J.
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Buffalo, SUNY; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：We examine the prevalence and determinants of CEOs' use of tax-advantaged trusts prior to their firm's IPO. Twenty-three percent of CEOs use tax-advantaged pre-IPO trusts, and share transfers into tax-advantaged trusts are positively associated with CEO equity wealth, estate taxes, and dynastic preferences. We project that pre-IPO trust use increases CEOs' dynastic wealth by approximately $830,000, on average. We next examine a simple model's prediction that trust use will be positively relate...
-
作者：Arif, Salman; De George, Emmanuel T.
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Miami
摘要：This paper examines how low financial reporting frequency affects investors' reliance on alternative sources of earnings information. We find that the returns of semi-annual earnings announcers (i.e., low reporting frequency stocks [LRF]) are almost twice as sensitive to the earnings announcement returns of U.S. industry bellwether peers for non-reporting periods compared to reporting periods. Strikingly, these heightened spillovers are followed by return reversals when investors finally obser...
-
作者：Kubick, Thomas R.; Robinson, John R.; Starks, Laura T.
作者单位：University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：When determining new equity grants, corporate boards face a tradeoff between the CEO's incentives generated from the grant's duration versus those arising from the convexity of the embedded equity risk. We hypothesize and find that boards lengthen the horizon of new compensation grants in the presence of greater preexisting compensation sensitivity to stock return volatility (vega). In addition, consistent with our hypothesis, we find stronger results in the presence of greater left-tail risk....
-
作者：Ma, Yuanyuan
摘要：I study the information content of management voluntary disclosures disciplined by shareholder litigation. I model the litigation mechanism in which legal liabilities are based on the damages that shareholders suffer from buying a stock at an inflated price. I find that management does not fully reveal private information in equilibrium. Instead, their disclosures reveal only a range in which their private information lies. Thus, the precision of information is, to some extent, lost. Notably, ...
