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作者：Sul, Edward S.
作者单位：George Washington University
摘要：Using the staggered adoption of takeover laws, this study examines implications of takeover threats on earnings management around the world. I find that the enactment of takeover legislation leads to increased earnings management (abnormally high accruals, target beating, and poor accruals quality). Results are driven by underperforming managers with higher turnover risk in countries with high increases in turnover sensitivity to performance, indicating job security concerns as the channel thr...
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作者：Bowlin, Kendall O.; Hobson, Jessen L.; Piercey, M. David
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作者：Schmidt, Brent A.; Zhang, Haiwen (Helen)
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We examine the impact of transparency on the convenience yield of AAA-rated asset-backed security (ABS) tranches. AAA tranches of ABS are commonly held by investors to manage financial liquidity and therefore enjoy a price premium beyond what is determined solely by the expected monetary payoff (i.e., convenience yield). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires ABS issuers to provide monthly disclosures about the performance of the underlying individual loans for ABS issued after ...
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作者：Bushee, Brian J.; Huang, Ying (Julie)
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Pennsylvania Medicine; University of Louisville
摘要：This paper examines whether analysts and investors efficiently incorporate the informational signals from managerial linguistic complexity (e.g., Fog) into their forecasts and trading decisions. We predict that a manager's Fog during a conference call provides a signal of their private information through their willingness to engage with analyst questions. We find that informative (obfuscatory) managerial Fog provides a positive (negative) signal of future earnings growth. We also find that an...
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作者：Kim, Jaewoo; Schonberger, Bryce; Wasley, Charles; Yang, Yucheng (John)
作者单位：University of Oregon; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; University of Rochester; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：This study examines whether information revealed by firms' earnings announcements (EAs) forecasts short-run market-wide volatility in equity index prices. Using an exponential generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity model that includes controls for the information in an array of macroeconomic announcements, we find that EA information aggregated across firms forecasts market volatility at daily and weekly intervals. EA information's forecasting power is greatest when more fir...
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作者：Asay, H. Scott; Hoopes, Jeffrey L.; Thornock, Jacob R.; Wilde, Jaron H.
作者单位：University of Iowa; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Brigham Young University
摘要：To what extent do U.S. consumers change their purchase behavior or, in the extreme, boycott companies based on negative information about corporate tax activities? Practitioner publications and academic research identify consumers as a key corporate tax stakeholder. But we have limited empirical evidence whether information about corporate tax activities influences consumer actions. We undertake a comprehensive study of this question, triangulating across several settings. First, a representat...
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作者：Oh, Jun; Yeung, P. Eric; Zhu, Bo
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Cornell University; Southwest Jiaotong University
摘要：We examine firms' voluntary disclosures of innovation under technology coopetition, focusing on technology standard setting organizations (SSOs). Technology coopetition is characterized by (1) cooperation to determine technology standards, which requires information sharing to reach consensus, and (2) competition for standard implementation to obtain standard-essential patents, which create incentives for firms to deviate from the expected level of information sharing. We document a decrease i...
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作者：Corona, Carlos; Kim, Tae Wook
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：We examine the effects of mandating compensation disclosure on executive incentive contracts, earnings management, firm value, and social welfare. We develop a moral hazard model with multiple principal -agent pairs facing an external monitor who allocates resources across firms to verify earnings management. With such scrutiny allocation, contracts exhibit externalities that create a coordination problem among principals. Contract disclosure enables principals to design the contract anticipat...
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作者：Krupa, Trent J.
作者单位：University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville
摘要：Tax aggressiveness presents nontax risks to firms' cash flow. Evaluating these risks requires information beyond the accounting function's expertise, resulting in high processing costs to acquire and integrate risk information relevant to tax strategies. Managers can rationally adapt by making assumptions about risk information, potentially resulting in decision biases when evaluating the risk-reward tradeoff of tax aggressiveness. Using a novel regulatory setting in the U.S. insurance industr...
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作者：Budde, Jorg; Hofmann, Christian
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Munich
摘要：We study the properties of long-term bonus pools (BPs) with rollover provision in a multiperiod moral hazard setting, where the principal uses subjective information to privately assess the agent's performance and the agent is protected by limited liability (LL). To provide incentives, the principal funds a multiperiod BP with a fixed payment that may be distributed over time to the agent and a third party. We find that the optimal long-term BP contract features performance targets that are co...
