Technology Coopetition and Voluntary Disclosures of Innovation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Oh, Jun; Yeung, P. Eric; Zhu, Bo
• 署名单位: Purdue University System; Purdue University; Cornell University; Southwest Jiaotong University
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/TAR-2022-0544
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 351-388
• 关键词: standard-setting organizations; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-RIGHTS; COORDINATION; performance; COMPETITION; industries; committees; ANTITRUST; patents

摘要

We examine firms' voluntary disclosures of innovation under technology coopetition, focusing on technology standard setting organizations (SSOs). Technology coopetition is characterized by (1) cooperation to determine technology standards, which requires information sharing to reach consensus, and (2) competition for standard implementation to obtain standard-essential patents, which create incentives for firms to deviate from the expected level of information sharing. We document a decrease in 10-K narrative R&D disclosures, more generic 10-K narrative R&D disclosures, and a longer delay of patent disclosures via the USPTO after a firm joins an SSO. Among alternative explanations, our evidence is most supportive of the hypothesis that firms strategically withhold innovation information.