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作者：Zhang, Vincent (Qiru)
作者单位：Santa Clara University
摘要：In 2010, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board proposed a rule change requiring the display of current credit ratings on the EMMA website, a centralized repository of municipal bond information. Before the rule change, current credit ratings were freely available on individual rating agencies' websites or on EMMA if municipalities provided relevant continuing disclosures, making it unclear whether the rule change would benefit investors. A difference-in-differences analysis reveals the rul...
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作者：Bonham, Jonathan D.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：I study productive activity, measurement, and compensation in a principal agent model that relaxes common restrictions on the action set of the agent, the distribution of performance measures, and the shape of the wage schedule. The solution to this relaxed problem unifies insights from extant theory and shares features with well-known empirical phenomena. In particular, the optimal outcome distribution has a kink, optimal measurement is conservative, and optimal wages ensure congruent incenti...
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作者：Mekhaimer, Mohamed; Soliman, Marwa; Zhang, Weining
作者单位：Saint John Fisher University
摘要：We examine the relation between political uncertainty and narrative disclosure complexity in conference calls. Using firm -level political uncertainty, we find that political uncertainty is positively associated with firms' disclosures complexity as measured by the Fog index. Decomposing complexity into two latent components- information and obfuscation-we show that political uncertainty significantly increases the obfuscation but has no impact on the information. Further analysis reveals that...
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作者：Kowaleski, Zachary T.; Sutherland, Andrew G.; Vetter, Felix W.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Mannheim
摘要：We study the influence of supervisors on employee misconduct at branches of U.S. financial institutions. Individual supervisor fixed effects explain twice as much variation in branch misconduct as firm fixed effects. Supervisor influence is concentrated in firms that theory suggests are most likely to delegate authority-firms with complex operations, distant branches, and trustworthy supervisors. Supervisors affect misconduct through their personnel decisions, attention to employees with past ...
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作者：Cadman, Brian D.; Campbell, John L.; Johnson, Ryan G.
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business
摘要：Boards of directors encourage risk -averse managers to take risky actions by providing stock options and severance pay. We demonstrate that the ability of these incentives to encourage risk -taking hinges on the level of uncertainty facing the manager. We confirm prior findings that stock option convexity encourages risk -taking but find that this relation only holds when market -wide uncertainty is low. We also confirm prior findings that severance pay encourages risk -taking but find that th...
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作者：Dehaan, Ed; Glover, Andrew
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：We examine the effects of stock market access, and in particular trading hours, on retail investment performance. Using discontinuities around time zone borders, we find that plausibly exogenous decreases in waking trading hours are associated with meaningful increases in retail investors' capital gains, as reported on tax returns for the U. S. population. Our results indicate that limiting trading hours curbs active retail trading, leading to improvements in portfolio performance. Our finding...
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作者：Chang, Yen-Cheng; Tseng, Kevin; Yu, Tzu-Wen
作者单位：National Taiwan University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：Access to firms' innovation outputs determines the extent of knowledge spillover that poses risk to innovation appropriability. We provide plausibly causal evidence that processing costs of financial disclosures, which inform users of the economic value of innovation, play a key role in firms' management of knowledge spillover. We exploit an exogenous, randomly assigned, and staggered policy shock by the SEC that reduces processing costs of mandatory financial disclosures. In response, firms r...
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作者：Lyle, Matthew R.; Yohn, Teri
作者单位：Emory University
摘要：This study offers solutions to help address practical issues researchers generally overlook when assessing gains from a trading signal. Specifically, the methodologies used in previous research generally ignore investor risk aversion when forming portfolios, do not update portfolios as signals arrive, exploit look -ahead biases, do not assess the incremental gains of a new signal, and do not consider market frictions. We examine trading signals based on post -earnings announcement drift (PEAD)...
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作者：Kausar, Asad; Park, You-il (Chris)
作者单位：American University; University of Hawaii System; University of Hawaii Manoa
摘要：Using a generalized aggregate -level difference -in -differences analysis across 32 countries over the 1991-2017 period, we find that the ability of aggregate earnings to predict one-year ahead GDP growth is greater for countries that adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) than those that did not. IFRS adoption also enables aggregate earnings to better predict growth in GDP components and related factors. We show that aggregate accruals drive this effect, not aggregate cash...
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作者：Duguay, Raphael
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：I evaluate the effect of financial statement audits on the governance practices of nonprofit organizations. Using a regression discontinuity design that exploits revenue-based exemption thresholds, I find that financial audits cause organizations to implement governance mechanisms, such as conflict of interest policies, whistleblower policies, and formal approval of the CEO's compensation by a committee. Consistent with these governance practices curtailing managers' private benefits, I docume...
