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作者：Gross, Christian; Wagenhofer, Alfred; Windisch, David
作者单位：University of Graz; University of Amsterdam; University of Graz
摘要：We examine whether the design of a firm's internal management accounting system is associated with GAAP earnings management. We exploit the fact that ASC 280 mandates a management approach requiring multisegment firms to disclose their segment earnings as defined internally by their management accounting system. We posit that the less these segment earnings are decoupled from GAAP earnings, the higher are the costs of earnings management because earnings management spills over to segment earni...
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作者：Bloomfield, Matthew J.; Friedman, Henry L.; Kim, Hwa Young
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：The negative effects of common ownership on competition have received significant attention, but many proposed mechanisms for institutional investor influence seem implausible. We develop and test an analytical model of optimal compensation in an oligopoly with common ownership, focusing on revenue-based pay as a plausible channel through which institutional investors might influence competition. Our model implies a negative effect of common ownership on firms' use of revenue-based pay. Using ...
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作者：Meng, Xiaojing
作者单位：New York University
摘要：There are instances where CEO turnover occurs, even if the company has not made any significant strategy changes, and the new CEO possesses similar abilities as the predecessor. This paper aims to provide a rational explanation for this seemingly irrational phenomenon. One possible reason for this aggressive CEO turnover is the board's desire to reduce the information rents earned by the privately informed CEO. Specifically, the incumbent CEO has a temptation to sandbag the board about profita...
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作者：Ahn, Byung Hyun; Bushman, Robert M.; Patatoukas, Panos N.
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Although activist short sellers can play a crucial role in fraud detection, they have come under scrutiny following accusations of systematically disseminating false negative information. We develop a framework delineating the roles of campaign-specific private information quality and short-selling dynamics in shaping disclosure incentives. We predict that the act of disclosure combined with pre-disclosure stock lending dynamics is informative about the quality of an activist's private informa...
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作者：Gomez, Enrique A.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University
摘要：I study the effect of the implementation of the SEC's EDGAR system on information asymmetry among investors. The SEC adopted EDGAR to decrease acquisition costs of mandatory filings. However, disclosure theory suggests that, even when acquisition costs are low, integration costs (i.e., costs necessary to filter and interpret information signals) may be so high that less sophisticated investors are disadvantaged, relative to their sophisticated peers. Consistent with this theory, I find evidenc...
