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作者：Aghamolla, Cyrus; Li, Nan
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：This study provides evidence that the use of conservative accounting in debt contracting depends on the enforceability of the contract. To test the effect of debt contract enforcement on borrowers' timely loss recognition, we exploit the staggered introduction of enhanced debt contract enforcement in Indian states as a natural experiment, where the implementation of the enforcement is exogenous to the accounting choices and borrowing behavior of firms. The main results show that enhanced enfor...
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作者：Bonner, Sarah; Majors, Tracie; Ritter, Stacey
作者单位：University of Southern California
摘要：Risk assessment is a critical audit task, as auditors' accuracy therein affects audit effectiveness and financial reporting quality, as well as audit efficiency. We propose that risk assessment accuracy for client risks that have changed from the prior year is affected by the manner in which auditors access prior year risk assessments, specifically whether they face a default option created by the prepopulation of current year workpapers with those assessments. We find that auditors with prepo...
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作者：Antle, Rick; Bogetoft, Peter
作者单位：Yale University; Copenhagen Business School
摘要：We investigate optimal rationing of resources and organizational slack when a principal procures from an agent with private information about fixed and variable costs. We study the problem in a two-period setting with persistent types and investigate how the optimal rationing and slack depend on whether production increases or decreases over time. We find that rationing in a dynamic model with persistent types is extra costly, since the types that are eliminated in period 1 might have been att...
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作者：Elliott, W. Brooke; Grant, Stephanie M.; Hodge, Frank D.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：We examine how CEOs can facilitate the development of investor trust that helps mitigate the effects of negative information. Results from an experiment show that investors trust the CEO more and are more willing to invest in the firm when the CEO communicates firm news followed by a negative earnings surprise through a personal Twitter account than when the news and surprise comes from the CEO via a website or from the firm's Investor Relations Twitter account or website. A follow-up experime...
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作者：Schroth, Josef
作者单位：Bank of Canada
摘要：This paper studies the role of optimal managerial compensation in reducing uncertainty about manager reporting objectives. It is shown that, paradoxically, firm owners allow managers with higher propensity to manipulate the short-term stock price to push for higher powered and more short-term-focused equity incentives. Such managers also work harder, and manipulate more, but may not generate higher firm profits. The model is consistent with existing empirical findings about the relationship be...
