Procurement with Asymmetric Information About Fixed and Variable Costs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Antle, Rick; Bogetoft, Peter
• 署名单位: Yale University; Copenhagen Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-8456
• DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12236
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1417-1452
• 关键词: Incentive compatibility; ORGANIZATIONAL SLACK; OPPORTUNITIES; management; CONTRACTS; DEA

摘要

We investigate optimal rationing of resources and organizational slack when a principal procures from an agent with private information about fixed and variable costs. We study the problem in a two-period setting with persistent types and investigate how the optimal rationing and slack depend on whether production increases or decreases over time. We find that rationing in a dynamic model with persistent types is extra costly, since the types that are eliminated in period 1 might have been attractive in period 2. The cost of rationing increases with the variability of production. If production levels are increasing (decreasing), the principal will be cautious when eliminating types with low variable (fixed) costs in period 1, since these types are particularly profitable in period 2. When production is more stable over time, harsher rationing can be applied in period 1, followed by less harsh rationing, if any, in period 2.