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作者：Kim, Jae B.; Shroff, Pervin; Vyas, Dushyantkumar; Wittenberg-Moerman, Regina
作者单位：Lehigh University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Toronto; University of Toronto; University of Southern California
摘要：We investigate how the availability of traded credit default swaps (CDSs) affects the referenced firms' voluntary disclosure choices. CDSs enable lenders to hedge their credit risk exposure, weakening their incentives to monitor borrowers. We predict that reduced lender monitoring in turn leads shareholders to intensify their monitoring and demand increased voluntary disclosure from managers. Consistent with this expectation, we find that managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts an...
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作者：Ertimur, Yonca; Rawson, Caleb; Rogers, Jonathan L.; Zechman, Sarah L. C.
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：We investigate executive employment gaps (hereafter, gaps) between the appointment of an external CEO at a public firm and the individual's prior executive position at a public company. These gaps cannot be reliably obtained from common databases. We hand-collect data for externally hired CEOs at public companies from 1992 to 2014. These CEOs represent approximately 40% of the 5,095 CEO successions and have a mean gap of 1.9 years. The gap increases to 3.2 years for the subset of new hires wit...
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作者：Bozanic, Zahn; Loumioti, Maria; Vasvari, Florin P.
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of London; London Business School
摘要：We examine whether syndicated loans securitized through collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) have more standardized financial covenants. We proxy for the standardization of covenants using the textual similarity of their contractual definitions. We find that securitized loans are associated with higher covenant standardization than nonsecuritized institutional loans. In addition, we show that CLOs with more diverse or frequently rebalanced portfolios are more likely to purchase loans with st...
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作者：Leung, Edith; Veenman, David
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; University of Amsterdam
摘要：This study examines the incremental information in loss firms' non-GAAP earnings disclosures relative to GAAP earnings. Using a large sample obtained through textual analysis and hand-collection, we posit and find that loss firms' non-GAAP earnings exclusions offset the low informativeness of GAAP losses for forecasting and valuation. Loss firms' non-GAAP earnings are highly predictive of future performance and are valued by investors, while the expenses excluded from GAAP earnings are not. Ad...
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作者：Bourveau, Thomas; Lou, Yun; Wang, Rencheng
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Singapore Management University; University of Melbourne
摘要：Using the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws in the United States, we study the effect of shareholder litigation risk on corporate disclosure. We find that disclosure significantly increases after UD laws make it more difficult to file derivative lawsuits. Specifically, firms issue more earnings forecasts and voluntary 8-K filings, and increase the length of management discussion and analysis (MD&A) in their 10-K filings. We further assess the direct and indirect channels through...
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作者：Granja, Joao
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：I exploit variation in the adoption of disclosure and supervisory regulation across U.S. states to examine their impact on the development and stability of commercial banks. The empirical results suggest that the adoption of state-level requirements to report financial statements in local newspapers is associated with greater stability and development of commercial banks. I also examine which political constituencies influence the adoption of disclosure and supervisory regulation. I find that ...
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作者：Aghamolla, Cyrus; Li, Nan
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：This study provides evidence that the use of conservative accounting in debt contracting depends on the enforceability of the contract. To test the effect of debt contract enforcement on borrowers' timely loss recognition, we exploit the staggered introduction of enhanced debt contract enforcement in Indian states as a natural experiment, where the implementation of the enforcement is exogenous to the accounting choices and borrowing behavior of firms. The main results show that enhanced enfor...
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作者：Jung, Michael J.; Wong, M. H. Franco; Zhang, X. Frank
作者单位：New York University; University of Toronto; Yale University
摘要：Companies' earnings conference calls are perceived to be venues for sell-side equity analysts to ask management questions. In this study, we examine another important conference call participantthe buy-side analystthat has been underexplored in the literature due to data limitations. Using a large sample of transcripts, we identify 3,834 buy-side analysts from 701 institutional investment firms who participated (i.e., asked a question) in 13,332 conference calls to examine the determinants and...
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作者：Allee, Kristian D.; Deangelis, Matthew D.; Moon, James R., Jr.
作者单位：University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University
摘要：In response to the increasing use of computer programs to process firm disclosures, this registered report develops a new measure of scriptability that reflects computerized, rather than human, information processing costs. We validate our measure using SEC filing-derived data from prior research and identify firm and disclosure characteristics related to it. In our planned hypothesis tests, we find some evidence that the speed of the market response to filings increases with scriptability, bu...
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作者：Hail, Luzi; Tahoun, Ahmed; Wang, Clare
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of London; London Business School; University of Iowa
摘要：Are regulatory interventions delayed reactions to market failures or can regulators proactively pre-empt corporate misbehavior? From a public interest view, we would expect effective regulation to ex ante mitigate agency conflicts between corporate insiders and outsiders, and prevent corporate misbehavior from occurring or quickly rectify transgressions. However, regulators are also self-interested and may be captured, uninformed, or ideological, and become less effective as a result. In this ...
