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作者:Kumar, Praveen; Langberg, Nisan; Oded, Jacob; Sivaramakrishnan, K.
作者单位:University of Houston System; University of Houston; Tel Aviv University; Rice University
摘要:We study the choice of disclosure and share repurchase strategies of informed managers using a model that captures how they differentially impact short and long-term stock value. We identify a partial disclosure equilibrium in which firms in the lowest value region neither disclose nor repurchase, firms with intermediate values disclose but do not repurchase, and firms in the highest value region induce undervaluation by not disclosing and buy back shares. In particular, the well known unravel...
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作者:Carrizosa, Richard; Ryan, Stephen G.
作者单位:University of Texas System; University of Texas El Paso; New York University
摘要:We identify covenants in commercial loan contracts that require public borrowers to periodically disclose two types of accountingzrelated private information to lenders: projected financial statements for future periods and monthly historical financial statements. We hypothesize and provide evidence that: (1) loan contracts include these covenants in settings where they enhance lenders' loan contract monitoring; (2) the covenants are positively associated with the frequency of loan contract am...
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作者:Call, Andrew C.; Campbell, John L.; Dhaliwal, Dan S.; Moon, James R., Jr.
作者单位:Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; University of Arizona; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University
摘要:We examine the association between employee quality and financial reporting outcomes. Using the average workforce education level in MSA(s) where the firm operates as a proxy for employee quality, we find that firms with a high-quality workforce exhibit higher accruals quality, fewer internal control violations, and fewer restatements. These firms also issue superior management forecasts, in terms of frequency, timeliness, accuracy, precision, and bias. Employees located at the firm's headquar...
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作者:Chen, Qi; Vashishtha, Rahul
作者单位:Duke University
摘要:Applying a difference-in-differences approach to explore variations in the timing of bank mergers in the U.S. over the last two decades, we document an increase in borrowers' disclosure when their banks engage in mergers and acquisitions. The effect is stronger among borrowers more reliant on services from the merging banks and when mergers cause larger changes in banks' monitoring and financing of borrowers. These findings suggest an information spillover effect from bank mergers to the publi...
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作者:Heese, Jonas; Khan, Mozaffar; Ramanna, Karthik
作者单位:Harvard University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Oxford
摘要:SEC oversight of publicly listed firms ranges from comment letter (CL) reviews of firms' reporting compliance to pursuing enforcement actions against violators. Prior literature finds that firm political connections (PC) negatively predict enforcement actions, inferring SEC capture. We present new evidence that firm PC positively predict CL reviews and substantive characteristics of such reviews, including the number of issues evaluated and the seniority of SEC staff involved. These results, r...
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作者:Dou, Ying
作者单位:University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要:When firms experience negative events such as lawsuits or earnings restatements, their directors also suffer. But what about those who leave shortly before the events? I show that directors who leave prior to negative events experience greater declines in the number of their directorships than directors who stay through the events, but smaller declines than directors who leave after the events. These declines do not appear to be voluntary or driven by forced departures. Instead, they appear to...
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作者:Glaeser, Stephen; Guay, Wayne R.
作者单位:University of Pennsylvania
摘要:Christensen et al. (2017) provide evidence that the dissemination of mine safety information in SEC filings has real effects on mine safety. We discuss the extent to which Christensen et al.'s results generalize to a research question that we consider of broader interest to accounting researchers, specifically where and when mandated disclosure in SEC filings can increase the dissemination of information. We also discuss identification of causal effects and generalizability concerns more broad...
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作者:Jongjaroenkamol, Prasart; Laux, Volker
作者单位:University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要:This paper examines the role of the financial reporting environment in selecting a new CEO from within versus outside the organization. Weak reporting controls allow the CEO to misreport performance information, which reduces the board's ability to detect and replace poorly-performing CEOs as well as aggravates incentive contracting. We show that these adverse effects are stronger when the CEO is an outsider rather than an insider. Our model predicts that boards are more likely to recruit a CE...
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作者:Caskey, Judson; Ozel, N. Bugra
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要:We examine the relation between workplace safety and managers' attempts to meet earnings expectations. Using establishment-level data on workplace safety from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, we document significantly higher injury/illness rates in firms that meet or just beat analyst forecasts compared to firms that miss or comfortably beat analyst forecasts. The higher injury/illness rates in firms that meet or just beat analyst forecasts are associated with both increases ...
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作者:Akins, Brian; Dou, Yiwei; Ng, Jeffrey
作者单位:Rice University; New York University; Hong Kong Polytechnic University
摘要:Building on the recent literature on corruption in bank lending, we examine the effect of country-level timely loan loss recognition by banks on lending corruption using a unique World Bank dataset that covers more than 3,600 firms across 44 countries. We find evidence consistent with timely loan loss recognition constraining lending corruption because it increases the likelihood of problem loans being uncovered earlier. In further analysis, we find timely loan loss recognition to be less asso...