Employee quality and financial reporting outcomes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Call, Andrew C.; Campbell, John L.; Dhaliwal, Dan S.; Moon, James R., Jr.
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; University of Arizona; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2017.06.003
• 发表日期: 2017
• 关键词: voluntary disclosure; earnings; association; INFORMATION; incentives; forecasts; Managers; accruals; whistle; equity

摘要

We examine the association between employee quality and financial reporting outcomes. Using the average workforce education level in MSA(s) where the firm operates as a proxy for employee quality, we find that firms with a high-quality workforce exhibit higher accruals quality, fewer internal control violations, and fewer restatements. These firms also issue superior management forecasts, in terms of frequency, timeliness, accuracy, precision, and bias. Employees located at the firm's headquarters primarily drive our findings. Our evidence suggests employee quality, particularly at a firm's headquarters, is associated with both mandatory and voluntary disclosure quality. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.