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作者：Levy, Hagit; Shalev, Ron
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); New York University
摘要：This study investigates how firm's bond repurchase objective affects its choice of repurchase method. Unlike tender offers, open-market repurchases are not pre-announced and buyer's identity is unknown to the seller. We provide evidence that firms are likely to repurchase on the open-market when bonds are mispriced and when firms seek to manage their financial reports, either to meet earnings targets or avert debt covenant violations. When firms seek to amend indenture terms, they prefer tende...
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作者：Dyer, Travis; Lang, Mark; Stice-Lawrence, Lorien
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of Southern California
摘要：We document marked trends in 10-K disclosure over the period 1996-2013, with increases in length, boilerplate, stickiness, and redundancy and decreases in specificity, readability, and the relative amount of hard information. We use Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) to examine specific topics and find that new FASB and SEC requirements explain most of the increase in length and that 3 of the 150 topics fair value, internal controls, and risk factor disclosures account for virtually all of the ...
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作者：Bradley, Daniel; Gokkaya, Sinan; Liu, Xi; Xie, Fei
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of South Florida; University System of Ohio; Ohio University; University System of Ohio; Miami University; University of Delaware
摘要：We examine whether analysts' prior industry experience influences their ability to serve as effective external firm monitors. Our analyses of firms' financial disclosure quality, executive compensation and CEO turnover decisions portray a consistent picture that related pre-analyst industry experience is of critical importance for analysts to play an effective monitoring role. Coverage by analysts with such experience is associated with reduced earnings management, lower probability of committ...
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作者：Aobdia, Daniel; Shroff, Nemit
作者单位：Northwestern University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We examine whether auditor regulatory oversight affects the value of financial statement audits. Using the PCAOB international inspection program as a setting to generate within country variation in regulatory oversight, we find that non-U.S. auditors inspected by the PCAOB gain 4% to 6% market share from competing auditors after PCAOB inspection reports are made public. When inspection findings reveal that an auditor has many engagement-level deficiencies, market share gains following inspect...
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作者：Badia, Marc; Duro, Miguel; Penalva, Fernando; Ryan, Stephen
作者单位：University of Navarra; IESE Business School; New York University
摘要：Firms measure fair values using Level 2 or 3 inputs when items do not trade in liquid markets, limiting market discipline over the measurements. We provide evidence that firms holding higher proportions of financial instruments measured at Level 2 and 3 fair values report more conditionally conservative comprehensive income attributable to fair value measurements, consistent with firms trying to mitigate investors' discounting of the measurements. We further predict and find that this conditio...
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作者：Even-Tov, Omri
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：In this paper I show that the bond price reaction to earnings announcements has predictive power for post-announcement stock returns and that this predictive ability is driven by the bonds of non-investment grade firms. I find that bonds' predictive ability is more pronounced in firms that have a lower level of institutional shareholder ownership and whose bonds are more liquid. This paper enhances our understanding of the relation between the stock and bond markets and complements the literat...
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作者：Bhojraj, Sanjeev; Sengupta, Partha; Zhang, Suning
作者单位：Cornell University; United States Department of the Treasury; Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; University of Iowa
摘要：This paper explores the potential role of anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) in long-term value creation. Using a change in the legal environment in Delaware as an exogenous event, we document that a subset of firms with a relatively longer term focus (innovative firms) benefit from ATPs. Particularly, these firms experience an increase in Tobin's Q following a state law change in Delaware that increases the effectiveness of ATPs in defending against hostile takeovers. This increase is greater th...
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作者：Srivastav, Abhishek; Keasey, Kevin; Mollah, Sabur; Vallascas, Francesco
作者单位：University of Leeds; University of Hull
摘要：In a cross-country setting we show the probability of a forced CEO turnover in large banks is positively associated with idiosyncratic tail risk. This finding is strengthened the greater the competition in the banking industry and when stakeholders have more to lose in the case of distress. Overall, the exposure to idiosyncratic tail risk offers valuable signals to bank boards on the quality of the choices made by CEOs. In contrast, systematic tail risk becomes important for forced CEO turnove...
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作者：Bird, Andrew; Edwards, Alexander; Shevlin, Terry
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; University of Toronto; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：We hypothesize and find evidence consistent with foreign firms being tax-favored acquirers of U.S. targets with greater locked-out earnings because they can avoid the U.S. tax on repatriations. This effect is economically significant; a standard deviation increase in lockout is associated with a 12% relative increase in the likelihood that an acquirer is foreign. We also find evidence that foreign acquirers of the target firms are more likely to be residents of countries that use territorial t...
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作者：Marinovic, Ivan; Povel, Paul
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Houston System; University of Houston
摘要：We study the effects of introducing competition for CEOs, assuming that the talent of CEOs is not observable and that they can misreport their performance. Without competition for talent, firms maximize their profits by offering inefficiently low-powered incentive contracts. Competition for talent removes those inefficiencies, but it leads to excessively high-powered incentive contracts, causing efficiency losses that can be more severe than the inefficiencies that competition mitigates. If mi...
