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作者:Zhang, Wen; Chen, Qi (George); Katok, Elena
作者单位:Baylor University; University of London; London Business School; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要:This paper considers a resourcing setting in which a qualified supplier (the incumbent) and multiple suppliers that have not yet been qualified (the entrants) compete in an open-bid descending auction for a single-supplier contract. Because of the risk of supplier nonperformance, the buyer only awards the contract to a qualified supplier; meanwhile, the buyer can conduct supplier qualification screening at a cost to verify whether the entrant suppliers can perform the contract. Conventionally,...
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作者:Zhu, Han; Chen, Youhua (Frank); Hu, Ming; Yang, Yi
作者单位:Dongbei University of Finance & Economics; City University of Hong Kong; University of Toronto; Zhejiang University
摘要:We study a continuous-review, two-echelon inventory system with one central warehouse, multiple local facilities, and each facility facing random demand. Local facilities replenish their stock from the central warehouse (or distribution center), which in turn places orders at an outside supplier with ample supply. Inventory replenishment at each location incurs a fixed-plus-variable cost for each shipment. The optimal policy remains unknown, and even if it exists, such a policy must be extreme...
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作者:Jusselin, Paul; Mastrolia, Thibaut; Rosenbaum, Mathieu
作者单位:Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要:We consider an auction market in which market makers fill the order book during a given time period while some other investors send market orders. We define the clearing price of the auction as the price maximizing the exchanged volume at the clearing time according to the supply and demand of each market participant. Then we derive in a semiexplicit form the error made between this clearing price and the efficient price as a function of the auction duration. We study the impact of the behavio...
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作者:de Kemp, A. Madelon; Mandjes, Michel; Olver, Neil
作者单位:University of Amsterdam; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要:A classic problem in appointment scheduling with applications in healthcare concerns the determination of the patients' arrival times that minimize a cost function that is a weighted sum of mean waiting times and mean idle times. One aspect of this problem is the sequencing problem, which focuses on ordering the patients. We assess the performance of the smallest-variance-first (SVF) rule, which sequences patients in order of increasing variance of their service durations. Although it is known...
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作者:Chan, Carri W.; Huang, Michael; Sarhangian, Vahid
作者单位:Columbia University; University of Toronto
摘要:Many service systems are staffed by workers who work in shifts. In this article, we study the dynamic assignment of servers to different areas of a service system at the beginning of discrete time intervals, namely, shifts. The ability to reassign servers at discrete intervals, rather than continuously, introduces a partial flexibility that provides an opportunity for reducing the expected waiting time of customers. The problem is primarily motivated by an application to nurse staffing in emer...
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作者:Cao, Ping; He, Shuangchi; Huang, Junfei; Liu, Yunan
作者单位:Chinese Academy of Sciences; University of Science & Technology of China, CAS; National University of Singapore; Chinese University of Hong Kong; North Carolina State University
摘要:There are two basic queue structures commonly adopted in service systems: the pooled structure, where waiting customers are organized into a single queue served by a group of servers, and the dedicated structure, where each server has her own queue. Although the pooled structure, known to minimize the servers' idle time, is widely used in large-scale service systems, this study reveals that the dedicated structure, along with the join-the-shortest-queue routing policy, could be more advantageo...
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作者:D'Errico, Marco; Roukny, Tarik
作者单位:European Central Bank
摘要:Over-the-counter markets are at the center of the global reform of the financial system. We show how the size and structure of these markets can undergo rapid and extensive changes when participants engage in portfolio compression, which is an optimization technology that exploits multilateral netting opportunities. We find that tightly knit and concentrated trading structures, as featured by many large over-the-counter markets, are especially susceptible to reductions of notional amounts and ...
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作者:Beyhaghi, Hedyeh; Golrezaei, Negin; Leme, Renato Paes; Pai, Martin; Sivan, Balasubramanian
作者单位:Toyota Technological Institute - Chicago; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要:We study revenue maximization through sequential posted-price (SPP) mechanisms in single-dimensional settings with n buyers and independent but not necessarily identical value distributions. We construct the SPP mechanisms by considering the best of two simple pricing rules: one that imitates the revenue optimal mechanism, namely, the Myersonian mechanism, via the taxation principle and the other that posts a uniform price. Our pricing rules are rather generalizable and yield the first improve...
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作者:Cao, Zhigang; Chen, Bo; Chen, Xujin; Wang, Changjun
作者单位:Beijing Jiaotong University; University of Warwick; Chinese Academy of Sciences; Academy of Mathematics & System Sciences, CAS; Chinese Academy of Sciences; University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, CAS; Beijing University of Technology
摘要:We propose a game model for selfish routing of atomic agents, who compete for use of a network to travel from their origins to a common destination as quickly as possible. We follow a frequently used rule that the latency an agent experiences on each edge is a constant transit time plus a variable waiting time in a queue. A key feature that differentiates our model from related ones is an edge-based tie-breaking rule for prioritizing agents in queueing when they reach an edge at the same time....
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作者:Balseiro, Santiago R.; Kim, Anthony; Russo, Daniel
作者单位:Columbia University; Amazon.com
摘要:We consider a principal who repeatedly interacts with a strategic agent holding private information. In each round, the agent observes an idiosyncratic shock drawn independently and identically from a distribution known to the agent but not to the principal. The utilities of the principal and the agent are determined by the values of the shock and outcomes that are chosen by the principal based on reports made by the agent. When the principal commits to a dynamic mechanism, the agent best-resp...