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作者：Senoner, Julian; Netland, Torbjorn; Feuerriegel, Stefan
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：We develop a data-driven decision model to improve process quality in manufacturing. A challenge for traditional methods in quality management is to handle high-dimensional and nonlinear manufacturing data. We address this challenge by adapting explainable artificial intelligence to the context of quality management. Specifically, we propose the use of nonlinear modeling with Shapley additive explanations to infer how a set of production parameters and the process quality of a manufacturing sy...
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作者：Bleichrodt, Han; van Loon, Rogier J. D. Potter; Prelec, Drazen
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper introduces the index tau = ln beta/ln delta as a measure of time inconsistency and vulnerability to self-control problems in the quasi-hyperbolic, beta-delta (beta, delta) discounting model. We provide a preference foundation for tau and, consequently, a revealed preference definition of failed self-control. The tau index is independent of utility and has an intuitive interpretation as the maximum number of future selves who can disagree with the current self with respect to uniform...
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作者：He, Xinhao; Li, Jin; Yuan, Zhaoneng
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; Peking University
摘要：We study the optimal contracting problem with subjective evaluation when the principal can ask the agent to revise his work. The possibility of revision benefits the principal by providing the option value of making another attempt at the work. However, it also introduces a new type of incentive problem for the principal: she may ask for revision even if it is inefficient to do so. This new incentive issue for the principal also affects the incentive of the agent: he may procrastinate his effo...
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作者：Tunc, Sait; Sandikci, Burhaneddin; Tanriover, Bekir
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; Istanbul Technical University; University of Arizona
摘要：Despite efforts to increase the supply of donated organs for transplantation, organ shortages persist. We study the problem of organ wastage in a queueing-theoretic framework. We establish that self-interested individuals set their utilization levels more conservatively in equilibrium than the socially efficient level. To reduce the resulting gap, we offer an incentive mechanism that recompenses candidates returning to the waitlist for retransplantation, who have accepted a predefined set of o...
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作者：Huang, He; Li, Zhipeng; Liu, De; Xu, Hongyan
作者单位：Chongqing University; Nanchang University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：Motivated by challenges facing IT procurement, this paper studies a hybrid procurement model in which a reverse auction of a fixed-price IT outsourcing contract may be followed by renegotiation to extend the contract's scope. In this model, the buyer balances the needs to incentivize noncontractible vendor investment and to curb the winning vendor's information rent by choosing the initial project scope and the buyer's investment in the quality of the project. We find that a buyermay benefit f...
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作者：Feng, Qi; Li, Yuanchen; Shanthikumar, J. George
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Tongji University
摘要：Supply chain contract negotiation has gained increasing attention in recent years, and the studies involving negotiations in the operations literature almost exclusively apply the concept of the Nash bargaining (NB) solution. The NB solution, however, is derived based on the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), an unrealistic assumption in many contexts. Indeed, our analysis suggests that the NB solution can lead to unreasonable negotiation outcomes in supply chains with hor...
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作者：Li, Qin; Lourie, Ben; Nekrasov, Alexander; Shevlinb, Terry
作者单位：Hong Kong Polytechnic University; University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：Employee turnover is a significant cost for businesses and a key human capital metric, but firms do not disclose this measure. We examine whether turnover is informative about future firm performance using a large panel of turnover data extracted from employees' online profiles. We find that turnover is negatively associated with future financial performance (one-quarter ahead return on assets and sales growth). The negative association between turnover and future performance is stronger for s...
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作者：Houde, Sebastien
作者单位：Grenoble Ecole Management
摘要：Voluntary environmental certification programs have been a popular tool used by governments, industry groups, and nonprofit organizations alike. A central question in the design of such programs is who should pay for them. In a context where firms respond strategically to a certification, the answer to this question is a priori ambiguous and, ultimately, empirical. This paper provides important insights on this question using ENERGY STAR, a voluntary certification program for energy-efficient ...
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作者：Carter, Mary Ellen; Lynch, Luann J.; Martin, Melissa A.
作者单位：Boston College; University of Virginia; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：Using proxy statement data describing the terms of compensation contracts, we examine how overlapping membership between compensation and audit committees influences the use of earnings metrics in compensation. Although research predicts that such overlap could either increase or decrease the reliance on earnings, we find that firms with overlapping directors rely less on earnings-based performance measures in incentive contracts without altering the overall level of performance-contingent cas...
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作者：Hougaard, Jens Leth; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.; Osterdald, Lars Peter
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; New York University; NYU Shanghai; Universidad Pablo de Olavide; Copenhagen Business School
摘要：We study the optimal management of evolving hierarchies of revenue-generating agents. The initiator invests into expanding the hierarchy by adding another agent, who will bring revenues to the joint venture and who will invest herself into expanding the hierarchy further, and so on. The higher the investments (which are private information), the higher the probability of expanding the hierarchy. An allocation scheme specifies how revenues are distributed, as the hierarchy evolves. We obtain sc...
