Optimal Management of Evolving Hierarchies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hougaard, Jens Leth; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.; Osterdald, Lars Peter
• 署名单位: University of Copenhagen; New York University; NYU Shanghai; Universidad Pablo de Olavide; Copenhagen Business School
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.4185
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 6024-6038
• 关键词: optimal allocation schemes; hierarchies; multi-level marketing; Nash equilibrium; Blockchain

摘要

We study the optimal management of evolving hierarchies of revenue-generating agents. The initiator invests into expanding the hierarchy by adding another agent, who will bring revenues to the joint venture and who will invest herself into expanding the hierarchy further, and so on. The higher the investments (which are private information), the higher the probability of expanding the hierarchy. An allocation scheme specifies how revenues are distributed, as the hierarchy evolves. We obtain schemes that are socially optimal and initiator-optimal, respectively. Our results have potential applications for blockchain, cryptocurrencies, socialmobilization, and multilevel marketing.