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作者：Bu, Jinzhi; Simchi-Levi, David; Wang, Li
作者单位：Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study a single product pricing problem with demand censoring in an offline data-driven setting. In this problem, a retailer has a finite amount of inventory and faces a random demand that is price sensitive in a linear fashion with unknown price sensitivity and base demand distribution. Any unsatisfied demand that exceeds the inventory level is lost and unobservable. We assume that the retailer has access to an offline data set consisting of triples of historical price, inventory level, and...
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作者：Feldman, Pnina; Frazelle, Andrew E.; Swinney, Robert
作者单位：Boston University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Duke University
摘要：Restaurant delivery platforms collect customer orders via the Internet, transmit them to restaurants, and deliver the orders to customers. They provide value to restaurants by expanding their markets, but critics claim they destroy restaurant profits by taking a percentage of revenues and generating congestion that negatively impacts dine-in customers. We consider these tensions using a model of a restaurant as a congested service system. We find that the predominant industry contract, in whic...
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作者：Ichihashi, Shota; Kim, Byung-Cheol
作者单位：Bank of Canada; Queens University - Canada; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa
摘要：We study competition for consumer attention in which platforms can sacrifice service quality for attention. A platform can choose the addictiveness of its service. A more addictive platform yields consumers a lower utility of participation but a higher marginal utility of allocating attention. We provide conditions under which increased competition can harm consumers by encouraging platforms to offer low-quality services. In particular, if attention is scarce, increased competition reduces the...
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作者：Mostagir, Mohamed; Siderius, James
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study the spread of misinformation in a social network characterized by unequal access to learning resources. Agents use social learning to uncover an unknown state of the world, and a principal strategically injects misinformation into the network to distort this learning process. A subset of agents throughout the network is endowed with knowledge of the true state. This gives rise to a natural definition of inequality: privileged communities have unrestricted access to these agents, where...
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作者：Laferriere, Vincent; Staubli, David; Thoni, Christian
作者单位：University of Lausanne
摘要：We report experimental data from standard market entry games and winner-take-all games. At odds with traditional decision-making models with risk aversion, the winner-take-all condition results in substantially more entry than the expected-payoff-equivalent market entry game. We explore three candidate explanations for excess entry: blind spot, illusion of control, and joy of winning, none of which receive empirical support. We provide a novel theoretical explanation for excess entry based on ...
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作者：Han, Yi; Liu, Yiming; Loewensteind, George
作者单位：Renmin University of China; Humboldt University of Berlin; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：When drawing inferences about a person's personal characteristics from the person's actions, correspondence bias is the tendency to overestimate the influence of those characteristics and underestimate the influence of situational factors, such as incentives the individual faces. We build a simple framework to formalize correspondence bias and test its predictions in an online experiment. Consistent with correspondence bias, subjects are, on average, willing to pay to receive the dictator-game...
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作者：Rathee, Shelly; Narula, Kritika; Mishra, Arul; Mishra, Himanshu
作者单位：Villanova University; Analysis Group Inc.; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
摘要：Long wait times for patients are an important health policy issue in many countries, especially developing countries in which there is generally poorer health infrastructure, appointments are not very common, and the opportunity cost of competing life priorities is high. In this research, we examine via field experiments in health clinics in India whether providing numeric versus alphanumeric wait tokens can affect pain perceptions of patients and whether the type of tokens can also affect the...
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作者：Shin, Dongwook; Vaccari, Stefano; Zeevi, Assaf
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Columbia University
摘要：This paper investigates how the pricing policy of a revenue-maximizing monopolist is influenced by the social learning dynamics of customers who use online reviews to estimate the quality of the product. A salient feature of our problem is that the customers' willingness to pay, and hence the demand function, evolves over time in conjunction with the online reviews. The monopolist strives to maximize its total expected revenue over a finite horizon by adjusting prices in response to these dyna...
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作者：Bu, Jinzhi; Gong, Xiting; Chao, Xiuli
作者单位：Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Chinese University of Hong Kong; Amazon.com; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We consider periodic review perishable inventory systems with a fixed product lifetime. Unsatisfied demand can be either lost or backlogged. The objective is to minimize the long-run average holding, penalty, and outdating cost. The optimal policy for these systems is notoriously complex and computationally intractable because of the curse of dimensionality. Hence, various heuristic replenishment policies are proposed in the literature, including the base-stock policy, which raises the total i...
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作者：Mai, Yunke; Hu, Bin; Pekec, Sasa
作者单位：University of Kentucky; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Duke University
摘要：In this paper, we study how an on-demand service platform could improve its performance through managing user conduct. In such a platform, service providers may reject certain platform-proposed service requests, and their responses, in turn, incentivize users to adjust their conduct. We develop an evolutionary game theory model of user conduct and provider responses that shows that the platform could improve user conduct through either setting a low wage for service providers or implementing p...
