Addictive Platforms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ichihashi, Shota; Kim, Byung-Cheol
• 署名单位: Bank of Canada; Queens University - Canada; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4392
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 1127-1145
• 关键词: digital platforms; platform competition; attention; addiction

摘要

We study competition for consumer attention in which platforms can sacrifice service quality for attention. A platform can choose the addictiveness of its service. A more addictive platform yields consumers a lower utility of participation but a higher marginal utility of allocating attention. We provide conditions under which increased competition can harm consumers by encouraging platforms to offer low-quality services. In particular, if attention is scarce, increased competition reduces the quality of services because business-stealing incentives induce platforms to increase addictiveness. Restricting consumers' platform usage may decrease addictiveness and improve consumer welfare. A platform's ability to charge for its service can also decrease addictiveness.