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作者：Kim, Tae Wook; Pae, Suil
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)
摘要：This study examines a reputation-concerned entrepreneur's incentives to provide disaggregated information about a project's future performance when the entrepreneur seeks to increase both the market price of the project and the market assessment of the entrepreneur's ability as a project manager. Two factors determine equilibrium: (i) the informational quality of the signal related to the entrepreneur's ability and (ii) the magnitude of reputational concerns. If the former is relatively low, t...
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作者：de Bettignies, Jean-Etienne; Liu, Hua Fang; Robinson, David T.; Gainulline, Bulat
作者单位：Kean University; Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We examine the impact of product market competition on innovation in markets for technology. An innovator makes an investment in quality-improving innovation that can be licensed to one (targeted licensing) or all (market-wide licensing) product market competitors. Our model points to a U-shaped relationship between competition in licensee product markets and innovation in the market for technology: at low levels of competition, market-wide licensing is optimal, and competition reduces innovat...
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作者：Huang, Yu; Ju, Nengjiu; Xing, Hao
作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University; Boston University
摘要：We develop a dynamicmodel where a principal contractswith an agent to operate a firm. The agent, protected by limited liability, trades privately a market portfolio to hedgemarket risk in his compensation. When liquidation cost of the firm is proportional to its size, the principal manages the termination risk by loading the contract with a positive market component, which alleviates termination risk in normal market conditions but makes termination more likely after negative market shocks. Th...
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作者：Bonsall, Samuel B.; Koharki, Kevin; Kraft, Pepa; Muller, Karl A., III; Sikochi, Anywhere
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Harvard University
摘要：We examine whether rating agencies act defensively toward issuers with a higher likelihood of default. We find that agencies' qualitative soft rating adjustments are more accurate as issuers' default risk grows, as evidenced by the adjustments leading to lower type I and type II error rates and better prediction of default and default recovery losses. We also find that soft adjustments' relevance increases with issuers' default risk, as evidenced by the adjustments being more predictive of ini...
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作者：Allen, Abigail; Petacchi, Reining C.
作者单位：Brigham Young University; Georgetown University
摘要：Widely acknowledged as one of the most controversial standards in governmental accounting, Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) Statements 67/68 radically altered both the recognition and measurement for defined benefit public pensions. The standards require the recognition of previously only disclosed unfunded pension liabilities and increase the magnitude of reported pension liabilities by requiring the partial incorporation of a market-based discount rate. Although the recognition...
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作者：Fainmesser, Itay P.; Galeotti, Andrea; Momot, Ruslan
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Johns Hopkins University; University of London; London Business School; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Northwestern University
摘要：We study the incentives of a digital business to collect and protect users' data. The users' data the business collects improve the service it provides to consumers, but they may also be accessed, at a cost, by strategic third parties in a way that harms users, imposing endogenous users' privacy costs. We characterize howthe revenuemodel of the business shapes its optimal data strategy: collection and protection of users' data. A business with a more data-driven revenue model will collect more...
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作者：Bostanci, Gorkem; Yildirim, Pinar; Jerath, Kinshuk
作者单位：University of British Columbia; University of Pennsylvania; University of Pennsylvania; Columbia University
摘要：Negative advertising provides information about the weaknesses of a competitor's product. We study negative advertising with a focus on how its regulation impacts product positioning for profit-maximizing firms. We build a model of informative advertising competition, where product positioning is endogenous, and consumers have rational expectations. We show that despite the informational benefits of negative advertising, permitting it (as the Federal Trade Commission in the United States does)...
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作者：Laferriere, Vincent; Staubli, David; Thoni, Christian
作者单位：University of Lausanne
摘要：We report experimental data from standard market entry games and winner-take-all games. At odds with traditional decision-making models with risk aversion, the winner-take-all condition results in substantially more entry than the expected-payoff-equivalent market entry game. We explore three candidate explanations for excess entry: blind spot, illusion of control, and joy of winning, none of which receive empirical support. We provide a novel theoretical explanation for excess entry based on ...
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作者：Han, Yi; Liu, Yiming; Loewensteind, George
作者单位：Renmin University of China; Humboldt University of Berlin; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：When drawing inferences about a person's personal characteristics from the person's actions, correspondence bias is the tendency to overestimate the influence of those characteristics and underestimate the influence of situational factors, such as incentives the individual faces. We build a simple framework to formalize correspondence bias and test its predictions in an online experiment. Consistent with correspondence bias, subjects are, on average, willing to pay to receive the dictator-game...
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作者：Gordon, Brett R.; Lovett, Mitchell J.; Luo, Bowen; Reeder, James C., III
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Rochester; Northeastern University; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：We study the effects of positive and negative advertising in presidential elections. We develop a model to disentangle these effects on voter turnout and candidate choice. The central empirical challenges are highly correlated and endogenous advertising quantities that are measured with error. To address these challenges, we construct a large set of potential instruments, including interactions with incumbency that we demonstrate provide the critical identifying variation, and apply machine-le...
