Disclosure of Disaggregated Information in the Presence of Reputational Concerns

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kim, Tae Wook; Pae, Suil
• 署名单位: University of Hong Kong; Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4561
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 5668-5690
• 关键词: voluntary disclosure; disaggregated information; reputational concerns

摘要

This study examines a reputation-concerned entrepreneur's incentives to provide disaggregated information about a project's future performance when the entrepreneur seeks to increase both the market price of the project and the market assessment of the entrepreneur's ability as a project manager. Two factors determine equilibrium: (i) the informational quality of the signal related to the entrepreneur's ability and (ii) the magnitude of reputational concerns. If the former is relatively low, the entrepreneur with moderate reputational concerns is more likely to provide disaggregated information when the signal about the project's overall performance is intermediate than when it is sufficiently good or bad. Also, given any value of the signal about the overall performance, this entrepreneur withholds disaggregated information when the signal about the entrepreneur's ability is intermediate rather than sufficiently good or bad. The comparative static results provide novel empirical predictions about disclosure of aggregate versus disaggregated information.