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作者：Manshadi, Vahideh; Niazadeh, Rad; Rodilitz, Scott
作者单位：Yale University; University of Chicago; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We study the allocative challenges that governmental and nonprofit organizations face when tasked with equitable and efficient rationing of a social good among agents whose needs (demands) realize sequentially and are possibly correlated. As one example, early in the COVID-19 pandemic, the Federal Emergency Management Agency faced overwhelming, temporally scattered, a priori uncertain, and correlated demands for medical supplies from different states. In such contexts, social planners aim to m...
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作者：Ai, Wei; Chen, Yan; Mei, Qiaozhu; Ye, Jieping; Zhang, Lingyu
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Tsinghua University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Shandong University
摘要：The gig economy provides workers with the benefits of autonomy and flexibility but at the expense of work identity and coworker bonds. Among the many reasons why gig workers leave their platforms, one unexplored aspect is the lack of an organization identity. In this study, we develop a team formation and interteam contest field experiment at a ride-sharing platform. We assign drivers to teams either randomly or based on similarity in age, hometown location, or productivity. Having these teams...
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作者：Papanastasiou, Yiangos; Yang, S. Alex; Zhang, Angela Huyue
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of London; London Business School; University of Hong Kong
摘要：We study the relative merits of different dispute resolution mechanisms in two-sided platforms in the context of disputes involving malicious reviews and blackmail. We develop a game-theoretic model of the strategic interactions between a seller and a (potentially malicious) consumer. In our model, the seller takes into account the impact of consumer reviews on his future earnings; recognizing this, a malicious consumer may attempt to blackmail the seller by purchasing the product, posting a n...
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作者：Fahn, Matthias
作者单位：Johannes Kepler University Linz; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：This paper analyzes a dynamic relational contract for employees with reciprocal preferences. A model of a long-term employment relationship is developed that implies that generous upfront wages activate the norm of reciprocity and then are more important when an employee is close to retirement. In earlier stages, direct incentives promising a bonus in exchange for effort are more effective. Hence, direct and reciprocity-based incentives reinforce each other and should be used in combination. M...
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作者：Wei, Chishen; Zhang, Lei
作者单位：Hong Kong Polytechnic University; City University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper studies the effect of trust on the perceived credibility of earnings news. Using earnings response coefficients, we find that firms located in low-trust regions of the United States experience significantly lower stock price reactions to earnings news. Additional tests indicate that managers can counterbalance investors' dependence on trust by employing reputable auditors or signaling the quality of their earnings using dividends to improve the perceived credibility of their financi...
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作者：Forbes, Silks J.; Kosova, Renata
作者单位：Tufts University; Imperial College London
摘要：We analyze how changes in the market structure of one industry-airlines-affect the performance of firms in a complementary industry-hotels-using an instrumental variables strategy to account for potential correlation between unobserved shocks to both markets. We find that more intense airline competition boosts hotel performance across all standard measures: price, occupancy rate, and revenue per available room. Spillovers vary across hotel quality and passenger type: Lower-quality branded hot...
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作者：Walker, Matthew J.; Katok, Elena; Shachat, Jason
作者单位：Newcastle University - UK; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Durham University; Wuhan University
摘要：In complex procurement projects, it is difficult to write enforceable contracts that condition price upon quality. Supplier nonperformance becomes an acute risk, particularly when there is intense competition for the contract. An established incentive mechanism used to mitigate the problem of supplier nonperformance is retainage, in which the buyer sets aside a portion of the purchase price. After project completion, the buyer determines the amount of retainage that is released to the seller, ...
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作者：Zhou, Wenhui; Huang, Weixiang; Hsu, Vernon N.; Guoc, Pengfei
作者单位：South China University of Technology; Chinese University of Hong Kong; City University of Hong Kong
摘要：We consider a mixed duopoly service system with two service providers (SPs): one private and the other public. The public SP's objective is welfare maximization, whereas the private SP is profit driven. Customers are heterogeneous in terms of their quality tastes and choose from three options, namely, joining the private queue, joining the public queue, and balking (or taking an outside option). We first consider the scenario where the private SP provides a premium service and the public SP pr...
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作者：Pornupatham, Sompong; Tan, Hun-Tong; Vichitsarawong, Thanyaluk; Yoo, G-Song
作者单位：Chulalongkorn University; Nanyang Technological University; Korea University
摘要：The decision usefulness of the direct versus indirect presentation method of a cash flow statement has been a long-standing issue in both practice and accounting research. By capitalizing on comparative advantages of experimental methods, we provide insights into how investors process the information contained in different presentation methods tomake cash flow forecasts, especially in the context of various types of non-recurring items. We predict and find that, when nonrecurring accrued expen...
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作者：Ovtchinnikov, Alexei V.; Valta, Philip
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University of Bern
摘要：Candidate self-funding, in particular self-loans, is a significant source of funding of political campaigns. Self-funding clusters among nonincumbent campaigns, republican campaigns, and more expensive campaigns. Self-funded campaigns raise less money from individuals and special interests and also spend less. Self-funders are wealthier on average and run in more competitive elections. The analysis of self-funders' legislative decisions shows that self-funders' votes, especially those of repub...
