Self-Funding of Political Campaigns

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ovtchinnikov, Alexei V.; Valta, Philip
• 署名单位: Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University of Bern
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4404
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 2425-2448
• 关键词: campaign self-funding; Voting behavior; political campaigns; incentives

摘要

Candidate self-funding, in particular self-loans, is a significant source of funding of political campaigns. Self-funding clusters among nonincumbent campaigns, republican campaigns, and more expensive campaigns. Self-funded campaigns raise less money from individuals and special interests and also spend less. Self-funders are wealthier on average and run in more competitive elections. The analysis of self-funders' legislative decisions shows that self-funders' votes, especially those of republicans, are significantly more sensitive to contributions from special interests that are affected by the votes. The results highlight the importance of considering politicians' self-funding choices in analyzing voting behavior and the value of political activism.