Reciprocity in Dynamic Employment Relationships

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fahn, Matthias
• 署名单位: Johannes Kepler University Linz; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4657
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 5816-5829
• 关键词: reciprocity; RELATIONAL CONTRACTS; norms and social preferences

摘要

This paper analyzes a dynamic relational contract for employees with reciprocal preferences. A model of a long-term employment relationship is developed that implies that generous upfront wages activate the norm of reciprocity and then are more important when an employee is close to retirement. In earlier stages, direct incentives promising a bonus in exchange for effort are more effective. Hence, direct and reciprocity-based incentives reinforce each other and should be used in combination. Moreover, a more competitive labor market may increase the utilization of reciprocity-based incentives.