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作者：Geoffrion, AM; Krishnan, R
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：This concludes a two-part commentary on management science and e-business, the theme of this two-part special issue. After reviewing the topical clusters that give organization to both parts, we sketch the papers appearing in this second part from the perspective of two key questions concerning the impact of the emerging digital economy on management science research: What fundamentally new research questions arise, and what kind of research enables progress on them. We then offer summary comm...
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作者：Anand, KS; Aron, R
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Web-based group-buying mechanisms are being widely used for both business-to-business (B2B) and business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions. We survey currently operational online group-buying markets, and then study this phenomenon using analytical models. We build on the literatures in information economics and operations management in our analytical model of a monopolist offering Web-based group-buying under different kinds of demand uncertainty. We derive the monopolist's optimal group-buying ...
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作者：Kleindorfer, PR; Wu, DJ
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：his paper surveys the underlying theory and practice in the use of options in support of emerging business-to-business (B2B) markets. Such options, on both capacity and output, play an important role in integrating long- and short-term contracting between multiple buyers and sellers in such markets. This trend is especially important in capital-intensive industries, where improvements in fine tuning the coordination of supply and demand carry large economic benefits. Typically, such options ar...
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作者：Pekec, A; Rothkopf, MH
作者单位：Duke University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：Combinatorial auctions have two features that greatly affect their design: computational complexity of winner determination and opportunities for cooperation among competitors. Dealing with these forces trade-offs between desirable auction properties such as allocative efficiency, revenue maximization, low transaction costs, fairness, failure freeness, and scalability. Computational complexity can be dealt with algorithmically by relegating the computational burden to bidders, by maintaining f...
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作者：Brynjolfsson, E; Hu, Y; Smith, MD
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：W e present a framework and empirical estimates that quantify the economic impact of increased product variety made available through electronic markets. While efficiency gains from increased competition significantly enhance consumer surplus, for instance, by leading to lower average selling prices, our present research shows that increased product variety made available through electronic markets can be a significantly larger source of consumer surplus gains.. One reason for increased produc...
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作者：Pinker, EJ; Seidmann, A; Vakrat, Y
作者单位：University of Rochester; Stanford University; McKinsey & Company
摘要：The Internet's computational power and flexibility have made auctions a widespread and integral part of both consumer and business markets. Though online auctions are a multibillion dollar annual activity, with a growing variety of sophisticated trading mechanisms, scientific research on them is at an early stage. This paper analyzes the current state of management science research on online auctions. It develops a broad research agenda for issues such as the behavior of online auction partici...
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作者：Carr, SM
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：As seen in the data of Snir and Hitt (2003), online service procurement auctions often end without achieving a contract despite active bidding, yet the existing auction literature is silent on why this occurs. One explanation for these unconsummated auctions may be that perfectly acceptable bids are submitted but disregarded because of the cost of assessing the bids' viability and the bidders' capabilities. This note examines this possibility by characterizing optimal and equilibrium bidding a...
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作者：Beil, DR; Wein, LM
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We consider a manufacturer who uses a reverse, or procurement, auction to determine which supplier will be awarded a contract. Each bid consists of a price and a set of nonprice attributes (e.g., quality, lead time). The manufacturer is assumed to know the parametric form of the suppliers' cost functions (in terms of the nonprice attributes), but has no prior information on the parameter values. We construct a multiround open-ascending auction mechanism, where the manufacturer announces a slig...
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作者：Snir, EM; Hitt, LM
作者单位：Southern Methodist University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Internet-enabled markets are becoming viable venues for procurement of professional services. We investigate bidding behavior within the most active area of these early knowledge markets-the market for software development. These markets are important both because they provide an early view of the effectiveness of online service markets and because they have a potentially large impact on how software development services are procured and provided. Using auction theory, we develop a theoretical...
