Combinatorial auction design

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pekec, A; Rothkopf, MH
• 署名单位: Duke University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.49.11.1485.20585
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 1485-1503
• 关键词: Auction design; combinatorial bidding; bidding with synergies

摘要

Combinatorial auctions have two features that greatly affect their design: computational complexity of winner determination and opportunities for cooperation among competitors. Dealing with these forces trade-offs between desirable auction properties such as allocative efficiency, revenue maximization, low transaction costs, fairness, failure freeness, and scalability. Computational complexity can be dealt with algorithmically by relegating the computational burden to bidders, by maintaining fairness in the face of computational limitations, by limiting biddable combinations, and by limiting the use of combinatorial bids. Combinatorial auction designs include single-round, first-price sealed bidding, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms, uniform and market-clearing price auctions, and iterative combinatorial. auctions. Combinatorial auction designs must deal with exposure problems, threshold problems, ways to keep the bidding moving at a reasonable pace, avoiding and resolving ties, and controlling complexity.