Note on Online auctions with costly bid evaluation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carr, SM
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.49.11.1521.20581
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 1521-1528
• 关键词: INTERNET; electronic market; software contracts; reverse auctions; Bidding; evaluation cost

摘要

As seen in the data of Snir and Hitt (2003), online service procurement auctions often end without achieving a contract despite active bidding, yet the existing auction literature is silent on why this occurs. One explanation for these unconsummated auctions may be that perfectly acceptable bids are submitted but disregarded because of the cost of assessing the bids' viability and the bidders' capabilities. This note examines this possibility by characterizing optimal and equilibrium bidding and bid-evaluation decisions in the presence of these costs.