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作者：Chen, RR; Roundy, RO; Zhang, RQ; Janakiraman, GE
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; Cornell University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; New York University
摘要：We consider multiunit Vickrey auctions for procurement supply chain settings. This is the first paper that incorporates transportation costs into auctions in a complex supply network. We first introduce an auction mechanism that makes simultaneous production and transportation decisions so that. the total supply chain cost is minimized and induces truth telling from the suppliers. Numerical study shows that considerable supply chain cost savings can be achieved if production and transportation...
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作者：Kwasnica, AM; Ledyard, JO; Porter, D; DeMartini, C
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; California Institute of Technology; California Institute of Technology; George Mason University; RAND Corporation
摘要：In this paper we present a new improved design for multiobject auctions and report on the results of experimental test's of that design. We merge the better features of two extant but very different auction processes, the Simultaneous Multiple Round (SMR) design used by the FCC to auction the electromagnetic spectrum and the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM) of Banks et al. (1989, Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: An experimental approach, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. ...
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作者：Parkes, DC; Kalagnanam, J
作者单位：Harvard University; International Business Machines (IBM); IBM USA
摘要：Multiattribute auctions extend traditional auction settings to allow negotiation over nonprice attributes such as weight, color, and terms of delivery, in addition to price and promise to improve market efficiency in markets with configurable goods. This paper provides an iterative auction design for an important special case of the multiattribute allocation problem with special (preferential independent) additive structure on the buyer value and seller costs. Auction ADDITIVE&DISCRETE provide...
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作者：Anandalingam, G; Raghavan, S
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
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作者：Günlük, O; Ladányi, L; de Vries, S
作者单位：International Business Machines (IBM); IBM USA; Technical University of Munich
摘要：W hen combinatorial bidding is permitted in auctions, such as the proposed FCC Auction #31, the resulting full valuations and winner-determination problem can be computationally challenging. We present a branch-and-price algorithm based on a set-packing formulation originally proposed by Dietrich and Forrest (2002, A column generation approach for combinatorial auctions, in Mathematics of the Internet: E-Auction and Markets. The IMA, Volumes in Mathematics and Its Applications Vol. 127, Spring...
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作者：Wu, DJ; Kleindorfer, PR
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper develops a framework for analyzing business-to-business (B2B) transactions and supply chain management based on integrating contract procurement markets with spot markets using capacity options and forwards. The framework is motivated by the emergence of B2B exchanges in several industrial sectors to facilitate such integrated contract and spot procurement. In the framework developed, a buyer and multiple sellers may either contract for delivery in advance (the contracting option) o...
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作者：Ding, M; Eliashberg, J; Huber, J; Saini, R
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Pennsylvania; Duke University; George Mason University
摘要：E-commerce has proved to be fertile ground for new business models, which may be patented (for up to 20 years) and have potentially far-reaching impact on the e-commerce landscape. One such electronic market is the reverse-auction model popularized by Priceline com. There is still uncertainty surrounding the survival of such new electronic markets currently available on the Internet. Understanding user behavior is necessary for better assessment of these sites' survival. This paper adds to eco...
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作者：Deltas, G; Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：This paper presents an equilibrium explanation for the persistence of naive bidding. Specifically, we consider a common value auction in which a naive bidder (who ignores the winner's curse) competes against a fully rational bidder. We show that the naive bidder earns higher equilibrium profits than the rational bidder when the signal distribution is symmetric and unimodal. We then consider a sequence of such auctions with randomly selected participants from a population of naive and rational ...
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作者：Viswanathan, S
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：Them from traditional channels. The interaction between firms operating across these differentiated channels involves interesting competitive dynamics that cannot be captured by isolated models of electronic markets. This paper develops a stylized spatial differentiation model to examine the impact of differences in channel flexibility, network externalities, and switching costs on competition between online, traditional, and hybrid firms. A basic model highlighting the moderating influence of...
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作者：Terwiesch, C; Savin, S; Hann, IH
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Columbia University; University of Southern California
摘要：We present a formal model of haggling between a name-your-own-price retailer and a set of individual buyers. Rather than posting a price, the retailer waits for potential buyers to submit offers for a given product and then chooses to either accept or reject them. Consumers whose offers have been rejected can invest in additional haggling effort and increment their offers. This pricing model allows the name-your-own-price retailer to engage in price discrimination: As haggling is costly for th...
