Efficient auction mechanisms for supply chain procurement

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, RR; Roundy, RO; Zhang, RQ; Janakiraman, GE
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Riverside; Cornell University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; New York University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0329
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 467-482
• 关键词: Mechanism design; VCG auctions; supply chain procurement

摘要

We consider multiunit Vickrey auctions for procurement supply chain settings. This is the first paper that incorporates transportation costs into auctions in a complex supply network. We first introduce an auction mechanism that makes simultaneous production and transportation decisions so that. the total supply chain cost is minimized and induces truth telling from the suppliers. Numerical study shows that considerable supply chain cost savings can be achieved if production and transportation costs are considered simultaneously. However, the,buyer's payments in such-auctions can be high. We then develop a new Vickrey-type auction that incorporates the buyer's reservation price, function into quantity allocation and payment decision. As a result, the buyer has some control over his payments at the expense of introducing uncertainty in the quantity acquired in the, auction.