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作者：Sandholm, T; Suri, S; Gilpin, A; Levine, D
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：Combinatorial auctions where bidders can bid on bundles of items' can lead to more economically efficient allocations, but determining the winners is NP-complete and inapproximable. We present CABOB, a sophisticated optimal search algorithm for the problem. It uses decomposition techniques, upper and lower, bounding (also across components), elaborate and dynamically chosen bid-ordering heuristics, and a host of structural observations. CABOB attempts to capture structure in any instance. with...
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作者：Anandalingam, G; Day, RW; Raghavan, S
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University of Connecticut
摘要：This paper presents an introductory survey for this special issue of Management Science on electronic markets. We acquaint the reader with some fundamental concepts in the study of electronic market mechanisms, while simultaneously presenting a survey and summary of the essential literature in this area. Along the way, we position each of the papers presented in this. special issue within the existing literature demonstrating the deep impact of these 14 articles on an already broad body of kno...
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作者：Kwon, RH; Anandalingam, G; Ungar, LH
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：In combinatorial auctions, multiple distinct items are sold simultaneously and a bidder may place a single bid on a set (package) of distinct items. The determination of packages for bidding is a nontrivial task, and existing efficient formats require that bidders know the set of packages and/or their valuations. In this paper, we extend an efficient ascending combinatorial auction mechanism to use approximate single-item pricing. The single-item prices in each round are derived from a linear ...
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作者：Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R; Kahn, CM
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：Low-revenue equilibria allow participants in an auction to obtain goods at prices lower than would prevail in a competitive market. These outcomes are generated as perfect equilibria of ascending-bid, multiunit auctions. We show that these equilibria are possible under mild conditions-conditions that are likely to prevail in many situations where auction formats have recently been adopted We argue that these equilibria could explain the low revenues of some recent auctions, and discuss potenti...
