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作者:Davis, JH; Schoorman, FD; Mayer, RC; Tan, HH
作者单位:University of Notre Dame; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Baylor University; National University of Singapore
摘要:Employee trust for the general manager is proposed as an internal organizational characteristic that provides a competitive advantage for the firm. This paper empirically examines the relationship between trust for a business unit's general manager and organizational performance. Trust was found to be significantly related to sales, profits and employee turnover in the restaurant industry. Managers who were either more or less trusted differed significantly in perceptions of their ability, ben...
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作者:McWilliams, A; Siegel, D
作者单位:Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Downtown Phoenix; University of Nottingham
摘要:Researchers have reported a positive, negative, and neutral impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on financial performance. This inconsistency may be due to flawed empirical analysis. In this paper, we demonstrate a particular flaw in existing econometric studies of the relationship between social and financial performance. These studies estimate the effect of CSR by regressing firm performance on corporate social performance, and several control variables. This model is misspecified...
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作者:Sorenson, O
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要:Managers must choose to allocate scarce resources either to the maintenance of a range of products tailored to heterogeneous consumer preferences or to the efficient production of a small number of products. In addition, managers must choose the degree to which they periodically cull the product line. Vigorous selection removes poor performers from the product line, but this action simultaneously impairs the firm's ability to monitor changes in consumer preferences. Empirical evidence from the...
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作者:O'Donnell, SW
作者单位:University of Delaware
摘要:In this study, two different theoretical perspectives are used to develop sets of hypotheses regarding the mechanisms used to manage foreign subsidiaries of multinational corporations. First, agency theory sen,es as the basis for a model that predicts the use of monitoring mechanisms and incentive compensation. Then, it is argued that these mechanisms are insufficient for managing subsidiaries characterized by high levels of intra-firm international interdependence, the management of which is ...
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作者:Shaw, JD; Gupta, N; Delery, JE
作者单位:University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; University of Kentucky
摘要:Competitive predictions regarding the relationships between: (a) monitoring and agent tenure, and (b) performance-contingent compensation are derived from agency theory and collaborative perspectives. These results are tested in a within-industry (trucking) sample and in a cross-industry sample. The results partially support both perspectives, particularly with respect to monitoring and agent tenure. Implications of the results for theory and practice are discussed Copyright (C) 2000 John Wile...