Empirical organizational-level examinations of agency and collaborative predictions of performance-contingent compensation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shaw, JD; Gupta, N; Delery, JE
• 署名单位: University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; University of Kentucky
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(200005)21:5<611::AID-SMJ106>3.0.CO;2-U
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 611-623
• 关键词: compensation contingencies; Agency theory; collaborative perspective

摘要

Competitive predictions regarding the relationships between: (a) monitoring and agent tenure, and (b) performance-contingent compensation are derived from agency theory and collaborative perspectives. These results are tested in a within-industry (trucking) sample and in a cross-industry sample. The results partially support both perspectives, particularly with respect to monitoring and agent tenure. Implications of the results for theory and practice are discussed Copyright (C) 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.