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作者:Donaldson, T
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作者:Hillman, AJ; Dalziel, T
作者单位:Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要:Boards of directors serve two important functions for organizations: monitoring management on behalf of shareholders and providing resources. Agency theorists assert that effective monitoring is a function of a board's incentives, whereas resource dependence theorists contend that the provision of resources is a function of board capital. We combine the two perspectives and argue that board capital affects both board monitoring and the provision of resources and that board incentives moderate ...
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作者:Aguilera, RV; Jackson, G
作者单位:University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要:We develop a theoretical model to describe and explain variation in corporate governance among advanced capitalist economies, identifying the social relations and institutional arrangements that shape who controls corporations. what interests corporations serve. and the allocation of rights and responsibilities among corporate stakeholders. Our actor-centered institutional approach explains firm-level corporate governance practices in terms of institutional factors that shape how actors' inter...
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作者:Sundaramurthy, C; Lewis, M
作者单位:California State University System; San Diego State University; University System of Ohio; University of Cincinnati
摘要:Corporate governance is an increasingly provocative topic, evident in ongoing debates between proponents of control versus collaborative approaches. We accommodate these contrasting approaches within a paradox framework, using agency and stewardship theories to elaborate the underlying tensions and to emphasize the value of monitoring. as well as empowerment. Building from these tensions, we examine reinforcing cycles that foster strategic persistence and organizational decline. We conclude by...
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作者:Daily, CM; Dalton, DR; Cannella, AA Jr
作者单位:Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要:The field of corporate governance is at a crossroads. Our knowledge of what we know about the efficacy of corporate governance mechanisms is rivaled by what we do not know. This special topic forum is dedicated to continuing the rich tradition of research in this area, with the hope that the models and theories offered will propel corporate governance research to the next level, enhancing our understanding of those governance structures and mechanisms that best serve organizational functioning.