Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hillman, AJ; Dalziel, T
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0363-7425
• DOI: 10.5465/amr.2003.10196729
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 383-396
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; financial performance; organizational performance; INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES; LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE; management; OWNERSHIP; bankruptcy; IMPACT; TIES

摘要

Boards of directors serve two important functions for organizations: monitoring management on behalf of shareholders and providing resources. Agency theorists assert that effective monitoring is a function of a board's incentives, whereas resource dependence theorists contend that the provision of resources is a function of board capital. We combine the two perspectives and argue that board capital affects both board monitoring and the provision of resources and that board incentives moderate these relationships.