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作者：Allmendinger, J; Hackman, JR
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Two periods of radical political-economic change in the former East Germany illuminate dynamics of organization-environment relationships that generally are hidden from view. Historical, qualitative, and survey data from a longitudinal comparative study of 78 orchestras in four nations show that the contexts of East German orchestras changed significantly when the socialist regime took power after World War II, and then again in 1990 when that regime fell. Socialist rule only modestly affected...
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作者：Bacharach, SB; Bamberger, P; Sonnenstuhl, WJ
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：Arguing that current theories of organizational change fail to pay adequate attention to how organizations move from one stable state to another, we generate a model of the organizational transformation process. We argue that to the degree that organizations are systems of exchange, they may be said to be transformed through a process by which the logics of action that parties bring to the exchange are aligned, misaligned, and realigned. Developing the concept of logic of action and drawing on...
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作者：Gioia, DA; Thomas, JB
摘要：This study investigates how top management teams in higher education institutions make sense of important issues that affect strategic change in modern academia. We used a two-phase research approach that progressed from a grounded model anchored in a case study to a quantitative, generalizable study of the issue interpretation process, using 611 executives from 372 colleges and universities in the United States. The findings suggest that under conditions of change, top management team members...
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作者：Lundberg, CC
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作者：Zajac, EJ; Westphal, JD
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：This study advances research on CEO-board relationships, interlocking directorates, and director reputation by examining how contests for intraorganizational power can affect interorganizational ties. We propose that powerful top managers seek to maintain their control by selecting and retaining board members with experience on other, passive boards and excluding individuals with experience on more active boards. We also propose that powerful boards similarly seek to maintain their control by ...
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作者：Lundberg, CC
