Director reputation, CEO-board power, and the dynamics of board interlocks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zajac, EJ; Westphal, JD
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
• 刊物名称: ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-8392
• DOI: 10.2307/2393940
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 507-529
• 关键词: CHIEF EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; corporate governance; UNITED-STATES; performance; OWNERSHIP; strategy; diversification; PERSPECTIVE; dismissal; adoption

摘要

This study advances research on CEO-board relationships, interlocking directorates, and director reputation by examining how contests for intraorganizational power can affect interorganizational ties. We propose that powerful top managers seek to maintain their control by selecting and retaining board members with experience on other, passive boards and excluding individuals with experience on more active boards. We also propose that powerful boards similarly seek to maintain their control by favoring directors with a reputation for more actively monitoring management and avoiding directors with experience on passive boards. Hypotheses are tested longitudinally using CEO-board data taken from 491 of the largest U.S. corporations over a recent seven-year period. The findings suggest that variation in CEO-board power relationships across organizations has contributed to a segmentation of the corporate director network. We discuss how our perspective can reconcile contrary views and debates on whether increased board control has diffused across large U.S. corporations.(.)