作者：ADMATI, AR; PFLEIDERER, P
摘要：We derive a role for inside investors. such as venture capitalists, in resolving various agency problems that arise in a multistage financial contracting problem. Absent an inside investor, the choice of securities is unlikely to reveal all private information, and overinvestment may occur. An inside investor, however, always makes optimal investment decisions if and only if he holds a fixed-fraction contract, where he always receives a fixed fraction of the project's payoff and finances that ...
作者：EVANS, MDD
摘要：A new empirical model for intertemporal capital asset pricing is presented that allows both time-varying risk premia and betas where the latter are identified from the dynamics of the conditional covariance of returns. The model is more successful in explaining the predictable variations in excess returns when the returns on the stock market and corporate bonds are included as risk factors than when,the stock market is the single factor. Although changes in the covariance of returns induce var...
