ROBUST FINANCIAL CONTRACTING AND THE ROLE OF VENTURE CAPITALISTS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: ADMATI, AR; PFLEIDERER, P
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb05146.x
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 371-402
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; investments; performance; debt

摘要

We derive a role for inside investors. such as venture capitalists, in resolving various agency problems that arise in a multistage financial contracting problem. Absent an inside investor, the choice of securities is unlikely to reveal all private information, and overinvestment may occur. An inside investor, however, always makes optimal investment decisions if and only if he holds a fixed-fraction contract, where he always receives a fixed fraction of the project's payoff and finances that same fraction of future investments. This contract also eliminates any incentives of the venture capitalist to misprice securities issued in later financing rounds.