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作者：Almazan, Andres; Banerji, Sanjay; De Motta, Adolfo
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Essex; McGill University
摘要：We provide a theory of informal communication-cheap talk-between firms and capital markets that incorporates the role of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. The analysis suggests that a policy of discretionary disclosure that encourages managers to attract the market's attention when the firm is substantially undervalued can create shareholder value. The theory also relates the credibility of managerial announcements to the use of stock-based compensation, the presence of infor...
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作者：Chacko, George C.; Jurek, Jakub W.; Stafford, Erik
作者单位：Santa Clara University; Harvard University; Harvard University
摘要：This paper models transaction costs as the rents that a monopolistic market maker extracts from impatient investors who trade via limit orders. We show that limit orders are American options. The limit prices inducing immediate execution of the order are functionally equivalent to bid and ask prices and can be solved for various transaction sizes to characterize the market maker's entire supply curve. We find considerable empirical support for the model's predictions in the cross-section of NY...
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作者：Dyck, Alexander; Volchkova, Natalya; Zingales, Luigi
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study the effect of media coverage on corporate governance by focusing on Russia in the period 1999 to 2002. We find that an investment fund's lobbying increases coverage of corporate governance violations in the Anglo-American press. We also find that coverage in the Anglo-American press increases the probability that a corporate governance violation is reversed. This effect is present even when we instrument coverage with an exogenous determinant, the fund's portfolio composition at the b...
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作者：Lindsey, Laura
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：This study documents a new value-added role of venture capitalists and addresses important questions about how resources are combined to create firms. As part of the nexus of contracts surrounding a firm, strategic alliances can be viewed as relational contracts that blur firm boundaries. This paper provides evidence that alliances are more frequent among companies sharing a common venture capitalist. The effect is concentrated in alliances in which contracting problems are more pronounced, co...
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作者：Vayanos, Dimitri; Weill, Pierre-Olivier
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We propose a model in which assets with identical cash flows can trade at different prices. Infinitely lived agents can establish long positions in a search spot market, or short positions by first borrowing an asset in a search repo market. We show that short-sellers can endogenously concentrate in one asset because of search externalities and the constraint that they must deliver the asset they borrowed. That asset enjoys greater liquidity, a higher lending fee (specialness), and trades at a...
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作者：Brown, Jeffrey R.; Ivkovic, Zoran; Smith, Paul A.; Weisbenner, Scott
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; National Bureau of Economic Research; Michigan State University
摘要：This paper establishes a causal relation between an individual's decision whether to own stocks and average stock market participation of the individual's community. We instrument for the average ownership of an individual's community with lagged average ownership of the states in which one's nonnative neighbors were born. Combining this instrumental variables approach with controls for individual and community fixed effects, a broad set of time-varying individual and community controls, and s...
