Attracting Attention: Cheap Managerial Talk and Costly Market Monitoring

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Almazan, Andres; Banerji, Sanjay; De Motta, Adolfo
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Essex; McGill University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01361.x
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 1399-1436
• 关键词: information; disclosure; incentives; management; AGENCY

摘要

We provide a theory of informal communication-cheap talk-between firms and capital markets that incorporates the role of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. The analysis suggests that a policy of discretionary disclosure that encourages managers to attract the market's attention when the firm is substantially undervalued can create shareholder value. The theory also relates the credibility of managerial announcements to the use of stock-based compensation, the presence of informed trading, and the liquidity of the stock. Our results are consistent with the existence of positive announcement effects produced by apparently innocuous corporate events (e.g., stock dividends, name changes).