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作者：Manso, Gustavo
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Motivating innovation is important in many incentive problems. This paper shows that the optimal innovation-motivating incentive scheme exhibits substantial tolerance (or even reward) for early failure and reward for long-term success. Moreover, commitment to a long-term compensation plan, job security, and timely feedback on performance are essential to motivate innovation. In the context of managerial compensation, the optimal innovation-motivating incentive scheme can be implemented via a c...
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作者：Morse, Adair; Nanda, Vikram; Seru, Amit
作者单位：University of Chicago; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：We argue that some powerful CEOs induce boards to shift the weight on performance measures toward the better performing measures, thereby rigging incentive pay. A simple model formalizes this intuition and gives an explicit structural form on the rigged incentive portion of CEO wage function. Using U.S. data, we find support for the model's predictions: rigging accounts for at least 10% of the compensation to performance sensitivity and it increases with CEO human capital and firm volatility. ...
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作者：Decamps, Jean-Paul; Mariotti, Thomas; Rochet, Jean-Charles; Villeneuve, Stephane
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Toulouse School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); University of Zurich
摘要：We develop a dynamic model of a firm facing agency costs of free cash flow and external financing costs, and derive an explicit solution for the firm's optimal balance sheet dynamics. Financial frictions affect issuance and dividend policies, the value of cash holdings, and the dynamics of stock prices. The model predicts that the marginal value of cash varies negatively with the stock price, and positively with the volatility of the stock price. This yields novel insights on the asymmetric vo...
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作者：Campello, Murillo; Lin, Chen; Ma, Yue; Zou, Hong
作者单位：Cornell University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Chinese University of Hong Kong; Lingnan University; City University of Hong Kong
摘要：We study the implications of hedging for corporate financing and investment. We do so using an extensive, hand-collected data set on corporate hedging activities. Hedging can lower the odds of negative realizations, thereby reducing the expected costs of financial distress. In theory, this should ease a firm's access to credit. Using a tax-based instrumental variable approach, we show that hedgers pay lower interest spreads and are less likely to have capital expenditure restrictions in their ...
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作者：Da, Zhi; Engelberg, Joseph; Gao, Pengjie
作者单位：University of Notre Dame; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We propose a new and direct measure of investor attention using search frequency in Google (Search Volume Index (SVI)). In a sample of Russell 3000 stocks from 2004 to 2008, we find that SVI (1) is correlated with but different from existing proxies of investor attention; (2) captures investor attention in a more timely fashion and (3) likely measures the attention of retail investors. An increase in SVI predicts higher stock prices in the next 2 weeks and an eventual price reversal within the...
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作者：Malmendier, Ulrike; Tate, Geoffrey; Yan, Jon
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We show that measurable managerial characteristics have significant explanatory power for corporate financing decisions. First, managers who believe that their firm is undervalued view external financing as overpriced, especially equity financing. Such overconfident managers use less external finance and, conditional on accessing external capital, issue less equity than their peers. Second, CEOs who grew up during the Great Depression are averse to debt and lean excessively on internal finance...
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作者：Bolton, Patrick; Chen, Hui; Wang, Neng
作者单位：Columbia University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We propose a model of dynamic investment, financing, and risk management for financially constrained firms. The model highlights the central importance of the endogenous marginal value of liquidity (cash and credit line) for corporate decisions. Our three main results are: (1) investment depends on the ratio of marginal q to the marginal value of liquidity, and the relation between investment and marginal q changes with the marginal source of funding; (2) optimal external financing and payout ...
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作者：Kadyrzhanova, Dalida; Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Harvard University
摘要：This paper develops a novel trade-off view of corporate governance. Using a model that integrates agency costs and bargaining benefits of management-friendly provisions, we identify the economic determinants of the resulting trade-offs for shareholder value. Consistent with the theory, our empirical analysis shows that provisions that allow managers to delay takeovers have significant bargaining effects and a positive relation with shareholder value in concentrated industries. By contrast, non...
