Motivating Innovation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Manso, Gustavo
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01688.x
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1823-1860
• 关键词: incentive contracts; moral hazard; bankruptcy; GROWTH; exploration; ECONOMICS; investors; MODEL; LAW

摘要

Motivating innovation is important in many incentive problems. This paper shows that the optimal innovation-motivating incentive scheme exhibits substantial tolerance (or even reward) for early failure and reward for long-term success. Moreover, commitment to a long-term compensation plan, job security, and timely feedback on performance are essential to motivate innovation. In the context of managerial compensation, the optimal innovation-motivating incentive scheme can be implemented via a combination of stock options with long vesting periods, option repricing, golden parachutes, and managerial entrenchment.