Corporate Taxes and Securitization

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Han, Joongho; Park, Kwangwoo; Pennacchi, George
• 署名单位: Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU); Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST); University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12157
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1287-1321
• 关键词: Financial intermediation; loan sales; debt; banks; taxation; IMPACT

摘要

Most banks pay corporate income taxes, but securitization vehicles do not. Our model shows that, when a bank faces strong loan demand but limited deposit market power, this tax asymmetry creates an incentive to sell loans despite less-efficient screening and monitoring of sold loans. Moreover, loan-selling increases as a bank's corporate income tax rate and capital requirement rise. Our empirical tests show that U.S. commercial banks sell more of their mortgages when they operate in states that impose higher corporate income taxes. A policy implication is that tax-induced loan-selling will rise if banks' required equity capital increases.