-
作者：Donaldson, Jason Roderick; Gromb, Denis; Piacentino, Giorgia
作者单位：University of Southern California; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We develop a theory of secured debt, unsecured debt, and debt with anti-dilution covenants. We assume that, as in practice, covenants convey the right to accelerate if violated, but the new secured debt retains its priority even if issued in violation of covenants. We find that such covenants are nonetheless useful: They provide state-contingent financing flexibility, balancing over- and underinvestment incentives. The optimal debt structure is multilayered, combining secured and unsecured deb...
-
作者：Di Maggio, Marco; Ma, Angela; Williams, Emily
作者单位：Imperial College London; Boston College; Harvard University
摘要：The reordering of transactions from high-to-low is a controversial bank practice thought to maximize fees paid by low-income customers on overdrawn accounts. We exploit a series of class-action lawsuits that mandated that some banks cease the practice. Using alternative credit bureau data, we find that after banks cease high-to-low reordering, low-income individuals reduce payday borrowing, increase consumption, realize long-term improvements in financial health, and gain access to lower-cost ...
-
作者：Hatfield, John william; Kominers, Scott duke; Lowery, Richard
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Harvard University; Harvard University
摘要：High commissions in the U.S. residential real estate agency market pose a puzzle for economic theory because brokerage is not a concentrated industry. We model brokered markets as a game in which agents post prices for customers and then choose which other agents to work with. We show that there exists an equilibrium in which each agent conditions working with other agents on those agents' posted prices. Prices can therefore be meaningfully higher than the competitive level (for a fixed discou...
