Collusion in Brokered Markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hatfield, John william; Kominers, Scott duke; Lowery, Richard
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Harvard University; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13432
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1417-1462
• 关键词: free entry; estate; intermediation; services; agents; COSTS; debt

摘要

High commissions in the U.S. residential real estate agency market pose a puzzle for economic theory because brokerage is not a concentrated industry. We model brokered markets as a game in which agents post prices for customers and then choose which other agents to work with. We show that there exists an equilibrium in which each agent conditions working with other agents on those agents' posted prices. Prices can therefore be meaningfully higher than the competitive level (for a fixed discount factor), regardless of the number of agents. Thus, brokered markets can remain uncompetitive even with low concentration and easy entry.