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作者：Bailey, Warren; Karolyi, G. Andrew; Salva, Carolina
作者单位：Cornell University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of Neuchatel
摘要：We examine market behavior around earnings announcements to understand the consequences of the increased disclosure that non-U.S. firms face when listing shares in the U.S. We find that absolute return and volume reactions to earnings announcements typically increase significantly once a company cross-lists in the U.S. Furthermore, these increases are greatest for firms from developed countries and for firms that pursue over-the-counter listings or private placements, which do not have stringe...
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作者：Santos, JAC; Rumble, AS
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
摘要：This paper investigates the equity investments and voting rights that American banks control through their trust business. The paper also studies whether the voting rights American banks control through their trust business help explain their presence on firms' corporate boards. We find that on average the largest 100 American banks control 10% of the voting rights of S&P 500 firms. We also find that there are several firms in the S&P 500 index in which the top banks control more than 20% of t...
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作者：Gomes-Casseres, B; Hagedoorn, J; Jaffe, AB
作者单位：Brandeis University; Maastricht University
摘要：We explore the role of interfirm alliances as a mechanism for sharing technological knowledge. We argue that knowledge flows between alliance partners will be greater than flows between pairs of nonallied firms, and less than flows between units within single firms. Using patent citations as a proxy for knowledge flows, we find results that are consistent with these expectations. We then explore how firm characteristics affect knowledge flows within alliances and find positive effects due to t...
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作者：Desai, MA; Dharmapala, D
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Connecticut
摘要：This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance and the growth of high-powered incentives for managers. A simple model demonstrates the role of feedback effects between tax sheltering and managerial diversion in determining how high-powered incentives influence tax sheltering decisions. A novel measure of corporate tax avoidance (the component of the book-tax gap not attributable to accounting accruals) allows for an investigation of the link between tax avoidance and incentive c...
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作者：Schwert, G. William
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作者：Campello, Murillo
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：Previous research seeks to establish whether debt boosts or hurts a firm's product market performance. This paper proposes that both of these outcomes can be observed: debt can boost and hurt performance. I first model a nonmonotonic relation between debt-like finance and competitive conduct. I then empirically examine the within-industry relation between leverage and sales performance using data from 115 industries over 30 years. My tests deal with the endogencity of debt in a novel fashion: ...
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作者：Cooper, Ian A.; Nyborg, Kjell G.
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Fernandez [2004b. The value of tax shields is not equal to the present value of tax shields. Journal of Financial Economics 73, 145-165] argues that the present value effect of the tax saving on debt cannot be calculated as simply the present value of the tax shields associated with interest. This contradicts standard results in the literature. It implies that, even though the capital market is complete, value-additivity is violated. As a consequence, adjusted present value formulae of a stand...
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作者：Villalonga, Belen; Amit, Raphael
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Using proxy data on all Fortune-500 firms during 1994-2000, we find that family ownership creates value only when the founder serves as CEO of the family firm or as Chairman with a hired CEO. Dual share classes, pyramids, and voting agreements reduce the founder's premium. When descendants serve as CEOs, firm value is destroyed. Our findings suggest that the classic owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms is more costly than the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in founder-C...
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作者：Rosenberg, JV; Schuermann, T
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
摘要：Integrated risk management for financial institutions requires an approach for aggregating risk types (market, credit, and operational) whose distributional shapes vary considerably. We construct the joint risk distribution for a typical large, internationally active bank using the method of copulas. This technique allows us to incorporate realistic marginal distributions that capture essential empirical features of these risks such as skewness and fat-tails while allowing for a rich dependenc...
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作者：Coles, JL; Daniel, ND; Naveen, L
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University
摘要：We provide empirical evidence of a strong causal relation between managerial compensation and investment policy, debt policy, and firm risk. Controlling for CEO pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and the feedback effects of firm policy and risk on the managerial compensation scheme, we find that higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (vega) implements riskier policy choices, including relatively more investment in R&D, less investment in PPE, more focus, and higher leverage. We ...
