How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Villalonga, Belen; Amit, Raphael
• 署名单位: Harvard University; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.12.005
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 385-417
• 关键词: family firms; OWNERSHIP; Control; management; Value

摘要

Using proxy data on all Fortune-500 firms during 1994-2000, we find that family ownership creates value only when the founder serves as CEO of the family firm or as Chairman with a hired CEO. Dual share classes, pyramids, and voting agreements reduce the founder's premium. When descendants serve as CEOs, firm value is destroyed. Our findings suggest that the classic owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms is more costly than the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in founder-CEO firms. However, the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in descendant-CEO firms is more costly than the owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.